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SALVATION OUTSIDE THE CHURCH: JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE 
THIRD PILLAR AFTER THE PUPINO AND SEGI JUDGMENTS
STEVE PEERS*
1. Introduction 
Eight years ago, as the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, when as-
sessing the judicial system of EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law, I 
borrowed a well-known British political metaphor and suggested that there 
was “something of the night” about EU cooperation in that area.1 Four Brit-
ish Home Secretaries later, is it time to conclude that the judicial system of 
the Third Pillar is “not fit for purpose”?2 To answer this question, we need 
in particular to examine the EU courts’ case law concerning the Third Pillar 
– which since Amsterdam basically covers cooperation in policing and crimi-
nal law  – as it has developed in the meantime, in the context of the adoption 
of much far-reaching legislation which affects the rights of individuals. The 
issue of effective judicial protection concerns not only the jurisdiction of the 
EU courts, but also the basic issues of the legal nature of the Third Pillar and 
the legal effect of Third Pillar measures. Substantively, the general principles 
of Community law have also made a significant contribution to ensuring the 
judicial protection of individuals.
This paper therefore considers the effectiveness of judicial protection with-
in the Third Pillar as it has been shaped to date by, in particular, the Court of 
Justice. To this end, an analysis is presented here of the following subjects: 
the jurisdiction of the EU courts over Third Pillar matters; the legal effect of 
Third Pillar matters in the national legal order (and the corresponding obliga-
tion upon national courts to ensure effective judicial protection); and the ap-
plication of the general principles of law to the Third Pillar.
* Professor of Law, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.
1. Peers, “Who Judges the Watchmen”, 18 YEL (2000), 337. This phrase was used to de-
scribe former Home Secretary (Justice and Interior Minister) Michael Howard. The “Watchmen” 
paper also discussed the Court’s jurisdiction over the First-Pillar aspects of EU Home Affairs law 
(immigration, asylum and civil law); for an updated analysis of this issue, see Peers, “The ECJ’s 
Jurisdiction over EC Immigration and Asylum Law: Time for a Change?” in Toner, Guild and 
Baldaccini (Eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, (forthcoming in Hart, 2007).
2. This phrase has been used by the current (at time of writing!) Home Secretary, John Reid, 
to describe his scandal-prone department.
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On the other hand, this paper does not examine a number of other topics 
relating to the Third Pillar: the substantive law of the Third Pillar;3 the contro-
versial issue of the dividing line between the Third Pillar and the First Pillar 
(Community law);4 the issue of competence within the Third Pillar, except 
for the general principles related to competence;5 nor does it examine the 
“judicial architecture” of the Union as a whole, though this might have to be 
reconsidered if the Court’s jurisdiction over policing and criminal law were 
expanded.6 
It will be clear from the following analysis that criminal law practitioners 
who are involved with the practical application of EU Third Pillar measures, 
and who are therefore directly concerned with the need to ensure effective 
judicial protection for their clients, need extensive knowledge of the detailed 
rules of Community constitutional law in order to consider fully the relation-
ship between Third Pillar measures and national law and to work out the 
implications of this relationship for specific cases. It is not the objective of 
this paper to explain the basics of the EC legal order for this purpose; indeed 
I have assumed that the readers of this Review are (over-) familiar with these 
basic rules: I do hope the paper will be useful to criminal practitioners who 
need to (re-)familiarize themselves with the relevant EC constitutional law. 
Of course, these issues would be moot (except, perhaps, as regards pre-
viously adopted measures) if the Third Pillar were integrated into the First 
Pillar, as provided for by the Constitutional Treaty,7 or by a provision of the 
current Treaty on European Union which provides a passerelle (or bridging 
clause) for this purpose.8 But with the Constitutional Treaty on ice and the 
fate of any possible replacement Treaty uncertain, as well as the recent rejec-
tion of the possible use of the passerelle,9 the particular aspects of judicial 
protection in relation to the Third Pillar could well remain a relevant topic for 
some time.
3. For a recent analysis see Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (OUP, 2006), 2nd edi-
tion, chs. 8–10.
4. See ibid. at pp. 390–397 and particularly: Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, [2005] 
ECR I-7879; Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, European Parliament v. Council and Commission, 
[2006] ECR I-4721; Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council and Case C-102/06, Ireland v. 
European Parliament and Council, pending.
5. See infra section 4.
6. On this issue, see the analysis in Peers, “The future of the EU judicial system and EC im-
migration and asylum law”, 7 EJML (2005) 263, which can be applied mutatis mutandis to the 
Third Pillar.
7. O.J. 2004, C 310. See now the IGC mandate agreed in June 2007.
8. See Art. 42 TEU.
9. See COM(2006)331, 28 Jun. 2006, and the Presidency Conclusions of the European 
Council of 14–15 Dec. 2006.
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So for the time being the Third Pillar is governed by the system of judicial 
protection dating from the Treaty of Amsterdam; and, as we shall see, a de-
tailed analysis of the case law to date indicates that, despite the best efforts of 
the high priests of European integration, the legal system established by the 
Third Pillar cannot sufficiently ensure an effective and uniform application of 
EU law or an adequate system of judicial control of the legality of EU mea-
sures. Such “salvation” can only be found within the core Community legal 
order.
2. Jurisdiction of the EU courts 
Any possibilities of judicial protection by the EC courts in relation to the 
Third Pillar are limited to situations considered by the courts to fall within 
their Third Pillar jurisdiction. Here, two types of situation must be distin-
guished. The first concerns the courts’ Third Pillar jurisdiction per se; the 
second concerns the circumstances in which the courts’ EC Treaty jurisdic-
tion is applicable to Third Pillar matters.
2.1. Third Pillar jurisdiction
The Court of Justice’s truncated jurisdiction over Third Pillar matters is es-
tablished in Article 46 TEU, in the final provisions of the EU Treaty, which 
provides that the EC Treaty provisions concerning the powers of the Court of 
Justice shall apply to “provisions of Title VI [the Third Pillar], under the con-
ditions provided for by Article 35”, as well as a number of other specifically 
defined categories, including the human rights clause (Art. 6(2) TEU) with 
regard to action of the institutions.10 So the next question is: what jurisdic-
tion does Article 35 TEU confer upon the EU courts? This provision was in-
serted by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and considerably widened the EU courts’ 
prior jurisdiction over the Third Pillar.11 First of all, the Court of Justice has 
jurisdiction, “subject to the conditions laid down in this Article, to give pre-
liminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and 
decisions, on the interpretation of conventions established under this Title and 
10. The other areas are: enhanced cooperation, the procedural stipulations concerning sus-
pension from EU membership (Art. 7 TEU) and the final Title VIII TEU.
11. Previously the Court only had jurisdiction to receive preliminary rulings or dispute settle-
ment actions concerning Conventions, if those Conventions made provision for this. Six criminal 
law or policing Conventions made such a provision, and four of these are in force. For details, see 
Peers (op. cit. supra note 3), 17–19.
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on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them.”12 This 
is subject to a declaration by a Member State that it accepts such jurisdic-
tion:13 fourteen Member States have made such a declaration.14 When Mem-
ber States make such a declaration, they must decide whether all their courts 
and tribunals, or only the final courts or tribunals, may make references for 
preliminary rulings to the Court.15 Twelve Member States have chosen to al-
low all courts and tribunals to refer, whereas Spain and Hungary have limited 
the power to refer questions to their final courts.16 Declaration 10 in the Final 
Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam provides that each Member State may, if it 
wishes, reserve the possibility of obliging its final courts to send questions 
on pending cases to the Court of Justice. Nine of the fourteen Member States 
making a declaration took up this possibility (the exceptions are Greece, Por-
tugal, Finland, Sweden, and Hungary).
All Member States can submit statements or observations when a prelimi-
nary ruling is pending before the Court of Justice, even if they have not opted 
in to the Court’s jurisdiction over references from national courts.17 However, 
the Court “shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality 
of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a 
Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding 
of internal security.”18
It should be noted that Article 35(1) TEU does not (expressly) confer juris-
diction upon the Court to give preliminary rulings regarding a fourth type of 
Third Pillar act: Common Positions.
Next, the Court has jurisdiction to “review the legality of framework deci-
sions and decisions” on the same grounds and under the same time limit as 
set out in Article 230 EC, but only the Commission and Member States are 
mentioned as potential applicants.19 Finally, the Court has jurisdiction over 
disputes between Member States as regards the “interpretation or application” 
of any of the measures referred to in Article 34 TEU (common positions, de-
cisions, framework decisions and Conventions), if a dispute cannot be settled 
in the Council within six months of the referral of the issue to the Council by 
12. See Art. 35(1) TEU.
13. See Art. 35(2) TEU.
14. These comprise twelve of the first fifteen Member States (all except the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark) plus Hungary and the Czech Republic. See the information in O.J. 2005, L 327/19.
15. See Art. 35(3) TEU.
16. See the information on the Court’s jurisdiction (supra note 14).
17. See Art. 35(4) TEU.
18. See Art. 35(5) TEU.
19. See Art. 35(6) TEU.
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a Member State, and over dispute between Member States and the Commis-
sion as regards the “interpretation or application of ” conventions.20
Furthermore, the Protocol on the Schengen acquis, which governs the in-
tegration of the Schengen acquis into the EC and EU legal orders, provides 
that the Court generally exercises its “normal” Third Pillar jurisdiction over 
the Schengen Convention, and measures implementing it adopted before 1 
May 1999, which have been allocated to the Third Pillar. On the other hand, it 
is not clear whether the Court has jurisdiction over treaties concluded within 
the framework of the Third Pillar, although the Court has assumed that it has 
jurisdiction to interpret the agreement associating Norway and Iceland with 
the Schengen acquis.21 
In practice, the Court has received no dispute settlement actions, and only 
two annulment actions.22 It has received two references for the interpretation 
of Framework Decisions, and one reference on the validity of a Framework 
Decision.23 The Court has also ruled on six references for interpretation of 
the Third Pillar provisions of the Schengen acquis concerning cross-border 
“double jeopardy”; two further such cases are pending, and two were with-
drawn.24 There were two references in 2001, three in 2003, two in 2004, and 
six in 2005, but none in 2006. As for geographical distribution, there have 
been five references from Belgium, three from Italy, two from Germany, and 
one each from Spain, France and the Netherlands. 
Several of the cases so far decided by the Court have clarified some im-
portant questions regarding the Court’s jurisdiction. In the Pupino judgment, 
to which we will return in detail below, the Court stated at paragraphs 19 and 
28 that, due to the reference to the Court’s EC Treaty jurisdiction in Article 
46(b) TEU, “the system under Article 234 EC is capable of being applied to 
Article 35 TEU, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 35.” It followed 
that the EC law rules on admissibility of references and the definition of a 
20. Art. 35(7) TEU.
21. Case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, [2006] ECR I-2333. 
22. Cases C-176/03, Commission v. Council and C-440/05, Commission v. Council, pend-
ing (supra note 7). See also the pre-Amsterdam Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council [1998] 
ECR I-2763.
23. Cases: C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285; C-467/05, Dell’Orto, pending (Opinion 
of 8 March 2007); and C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, judgment of 3 May 2007, nyr. 
24. Joined Cases C-187 & 385/01, Gozutok and Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345; Case C-469/03, 
Miraglia, [2005] ECR I-2009; Van Esbroeck (supra note 21); Case C-467/04, Gasparini and 
Case C-150/05, Van Straaten (both judgments of 28 Sep. 2006, nyr); and Cases C-288/05, Kretz-
inger and C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink (Opinions of 5 Dec. 2006, pending). On the substance of 
these cases, see Peers, “Double Jeopardy and EU Law: Time for a Change?”, forthcoming in 
(2007) European Journal of Law Reform. The withdrawn cases were Case C-491/03, Hiebeler 
and Case C-272/05, Bowens.
888  Peers CML Rev. 2007
“court or tribunal” which could send references apply.25 The Court has sub-
sequently repeated the general point that Article 234 EC applies in principle 
to the Third Pillar,26 and has also applied the EC Treaty jurisprudence on the 
respective roles of national courts and the Court of Justice,27 as well as ap-
plying the EC Treaty rules on admissibility of references.28 Furthermore, the 
Court has apparently endorsed a “concrete” interpretation of the concept of 
final court as regards the Third Pillar (i.e. the court which is the final court 
of appeal for a particular case is the final court for the purposes of the Treaty 
rules).29 As for annulment actions, in Commission v. Council, the underlying 
principles governing annulment actions under Article 230 EC were implicitly 
applied.30 
However, the bigger question is whether the EU courts have any Third 
Pillar jurisdiction besides that conferred upon them by Article 35 TEU. This 
issue was first raised before the Court of Justice when Spain brought an an-
nulment action against Eurojust, the EU prosecutors’ agency, concerning the 
language requirements relating to the hiring of certain Eurojust staff.31 How-
ever, Spain brought its challenge pursuant to Article 230 EC, and the Court 
ruled that this EC Treaty Article was not applicable to Eurojust.32 Nor did 
Article 41 TEU, which makes a number of EC Treaty provisions applicable 
to the Third Pillar, make this EC Treaty Article applicable in the context of 
the Third Pillar, “the jurisdiction of the Court in such matters being defined 
in Article 35 TEU, to which Article 46(b) TEU refers”.33 However, the Court 
then commented on Spain’s argument concerning effective judicial protec-
tion: “As regards the right to effective judicial protection in a community 
based on the rule of law which, in the view of the Kingdom of Spain, requires 
that all decisions of a body with legal personality subject to Community law 
be amenable to judicial review, it must be observed that the acts contested 
in this case are not exempt from judicial review.”34 This review flowed from 
the provisions of the Eurojust decision which made applicable the EC’s staff 
25. See Pupino, supra note 23, paras 29 and 30 and 22.
26. See the judgments in Gasparini (supra note 24), para 41, and Van Straaten (supra note 
24), para 31.
27. See the judgments in Gasparini, para 41, and Van Straaten, paras 33 and 37.
28. See the judgments in Gasparini, paras 42–45, Van Straaten, paras 31–39, and Advocaten 
voor de Wereld, supra note 23, paras 19–22. See further the Opinion in Kretzinger, supra note 
24, paras 79–80.
29. See the judgment in Gasparini, supra note 24, paras 12, 15 and 21.
30. See supra note 7. 
31. Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, [2005] ECR I-2077.
32. Ibid. paras 35–40.
33. Ibid. para 38.
34. Ibid. para 41.
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regulations to Eurojust staff. This meant that would-be job applicants could, 
following the case law on the EC staff regulations, bring proceedings before 
the EU courts; the Member States have the power to intervene in such cases 
and even appeal relevant judgments of the Court of First Instance to the Court 
of Justice.35 
The Court’s judgment did not expressly state whether Article 35 TEU must 
be considered to set out its Third Pillar jurisdiction exhaustively. In light of 
the later Segi judgment (see discussion below), in which the Court appears to 
confirm that Article 35 does set out an exhaustive list, the Court’s jurisdiction 
can only be explained by examining the circumstances in which the Court’s 
First Pillar jurisdiction applies to the Third Pillar (see further below). 
Moreover, the Court does not clearly state in this judgment whether or 
not it agrees with the Spanish argument that all EU bodies taking decisions 
must be subject to judicial review, or even whether it agrees that the Union is 
“based on the rule of law”. The Court also missed the opportunity to clarify 
whether Article 230 EC as such applied to the Third Pillar, subject to the con-
ditions of Article 35 TEU, in parallel with the application of Article 234 EC 
as such to the Third Pillar, according to the later Pupino judgment.
The implication of this judgment is that would-be staff members of any 
other Third Pillar bodies which must apply the EU’s staff regulations are also 
subject to the jurisdiction of the EU courts. It should logically follow by anal-
ogy that all existing or previous staff members of such bodies must also have 
access to the courts, for example to bring disputes concerning their working 
conditions, promotion, dismissal or pensions, because it is hard to see how a 
distinction could be made, consistent with the Court’s reasoning (such as it is) 
between current, previous and potential staff members, in favour of the latter. 
In fact, a challenge to a Eurojust decision brought by a former staff member 
is indeed pending before the Civil Service Tribunal.36 In addition to Eurojust, 
the other Third Pillar body applying the EC’s staff regulations is the European 
Police College,37 and the Commission has proposed that Europol will be sub-
ject to these regulations in future.38
The broader potential implication of the judgment is that the application of 
other secondary EC law measures to the Third Pillar, for example the rules on 
35. Ibid. paras 42 and 43. This must now be taken as a reference to the right of a Member 
State to appeal a ruling of the Civil Service Tribunal to the CFI: see Art. 9 of Annex I to the 
Court’s Statute, annexed to the Decision establishing the Tribunal (O.J. 2004, L 333/7).
36. Case F-61/06, Sapara v. Eurojust.
37. See Art. 13 of the Decision (re-)establishing the College (O.J. 2005, L 256/63). 
38. See Art. 38 of the proposed Decision (re-)establishing Europol (COM(2006)817, 20 Dec. 
2006). 
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privileges and immunities, bring with them the Court’s jurisdiction as well.39 
But does this line of argument beg the question, given that the EU Treaty in 
fact makes no reference to the application of the EC staff regulations or EC 
privileges and immunities within the context of the Third Pillar?40 Even more 
broadly, if the Third Pillar is indeed subject to the “rule of law” principle, 
what might the further implications of this be? 
The Court of Justice has subsequently developed the “rule of law” issue 
further in the Segi appeal, considered further below. First, however, it is use-
ful to compare the ruling in the Spain v. Eurojust case with the Opinion of the 
Advocate General in the same case.41 After recapitulating the basic principle 
that all acts of EU bodies creating legal effects should be subject to judicial 
review, the Advocate General argued that “there is no obstacle preventing the 
Community system of law and the guarantees deriving from it from being ex-
tended to the European Union”. In particular, the Court’s role to ensure com-
pliance with the law, in accordance with Article 220 EC, applies to the Third 
Pillar, as “[t]hat is the logical implication of a Union based on the rule of law, 
as referred to in Article 6 TEU. In a Union governed by the rule of law, it is 
essential for measures of Union institutions and bodies to be amenable to re-
view by a Union Court, so long as they are intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties.”42 But the Opinion recognized that the jurisdictional 
rules for the Third Pillar remained more limited than in the First Pillar, for 
“[a]lthough the principles of legality and effective judicial review, upheld in 
the Community context, also prevail in the context of a Union governed by 
the rule of law, it does not follow that the rules and arrangements for review-
ing legality are identical”.43
First, as to the nature of the measures contested, the absence of a provision 
in the EU Treaty for a challenge to Eurojust acts “cannot constitute an ab-
solute impediment to the admission of an action”, following EC Treaty case 
law; so “it is appropriate to admit an action against a Union body to the extent 
to which it has a legislative function, even if it is used only on an exceptional 
basis”. Moreover, the EC Treaty principle that “an action for annulment may 
be brought against all measures which produce legal effects, whatever their 
nature, form, or authorship….clearly applies in the context of the Union”, so 
“‘the very idea of legality’, as it must prevail in a Union governed by the rule 
39. The specific issue of Court jurisdiction regarding the use of the EC budget is considered 
infra section 2.2.
40. This issue is considered further infra section 2.2.
41. Spain v. Eurojust, supra note 31.
42. See Opinion of A.G. Maduro in Spain v. Eurojust, supra note 31, para 17 (emphasis in 
the original).
43. Ibid. at para 19.
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of law” must enable some applicants to seek annulment of “any” Third Pillar 
measures “which produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.”44
Second, the standing of the applicant did not cause a problem in this case 
because the applicant was a Member State, and the lack of an “interest” re-
quirement for Member States to challenge EC measures should be transposed 
to the Third Pillar, due to the parallel between the first and Third Pillar ac-
tions for annulment. The special nature of EC staff litigation should not pre-
vent a Member State from bringing actions for annulment in that context.45 
To support this argument, the Advocate General referred to a judgment in 
which the Court accepted the admissibility of an annulment action brought by 
a Member State against a Commission decision addressed to another Member 
State pursuant to Article 86 EC.46 But with respect, this judgment cannot be 
assumed to apply by analogy to staff proceedings, which are governed by a 
separate provision of the EC Treaty, which gives “jurisdiction to the Court in 
any dispute between the Community and its servants within the limits and un-
der the conditions laid down” in the relevant secondary legislation.47 
In contrast to the judgment, the Advocate General’s Opinion far more 
clearly endorsed the application of the relevant basic principles of the Com-
munity legal order to the Third Pillar, and argued expressly for a wide inter-
pretation of the Third Pillar rules on standing (as far as staff litigation was 
concerned) and on the potential defendants of Third Pillar actions (which, 
with respect, quite clearly would, in the interest of the rule of law, have disre-
garded the conditions for bringing an action for annulment in the Third Pillar, 
albeit consistently with the disregard of the conditions applicable in the First 
Pillar). While in this case, the Advocate General’s arguments apparently foun-
dered on the lack of standing for Member States to bring staff cases within 
the Community legal order, they may have influenced the later Segi judg-
ment, discussed below.
Next, in the Pupino judgment, the Court of Justice referred expressly (as 
noted above) to Article 46(b) TEU, which confers Third Pillar jurisdiction 
upon it, but without stating whether this provision could be considered ex-
haustive.48 The Court also stated in passing that “the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice is less extensive under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union 
than it is under the EC Treaty” and that “there is no complete system of ac-
44. Ibid. at paras. 20–21.
45. Ibid. at paras. 22–23.
46. Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, [1985] ECR 873.
47. Art. 236 EC.
48. See supra note 23 at para 19 of the judgment.
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tions and procedures designed to ensure the legality of the acts of the institu-
tions in the context of ” the Third Pillar.49 
For its part, the Court of First Instance was first faced with questions con-
cerning the extent of its Third Pillar jurisdiction in Segi,50 where an alleged 
“domestic” terrorist group (i.e. based within the EU) brought a damages ac-
tion to challenge its classification as “terrorist” by the Council, which had 
chosen the instrument of a Common Position adopted jointly using the EU’s 
second and Third Pillar powers to this end.51 Whereas groups or persons who 
are allegedly “international” terrorists (i.e. based outside the EU) are fur-
thermore subject to Community legislation which freezes their assets, and 
which is therefore indisputably subject to the jurisdiction of the EU courts,52 
“domestic” terrorists are only affected by the obligation placed by EU Com-
mon Positions upon Member States to step up cooperation within the scope 
of the Third Pillar between police forces and prosecutors. Nonetheless, Segi 
objected to being classified as a terrorist group.53 
In rejecting the claim for damages, the Court of First Instance stated that 
Article 46 TEU “exhaustively” lists the Court’s jurisdiction concerning the 
EU Treaty, by reference to Article 35 TEU.54 It then noted that Article 35 TEU 
provides only for references, dispute settlement and annulment actions,55 after 
stating that there is no provision for a “judicial remedy” concerning com-
49. Ibid. at para 35 of the judgment.
50. Orders of the CFI of 7 June 2004 in Cases T-333/02 (unreported) and T-338/02, Segi and 
others, [2004] ECR II-1647, para 35.
51. See the earlier Second Pillar claim for damages resulting from the Community measures 
linked to the allegedly illegal military action against the former Yugoslavia in respect of Kosovo 
(T-201/99, Royal Olympic, [2000] ECR II-4005). The CFI dismissed this claim with the general 
statement that Art. 46 TEU did not confer jurisdiction for the EU courts over actions of the EU, 
and that EC measures were insufficiently linked to the military action. An appeal was dismissed 
by an unpublished order of the ECJ (Case C-49/01, order of 15 Jan. 2002).
52. See the judgments in Cases T-306/01, Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533 (on appeal as Case C-
415/05 P, pending); T-315/01, Kadi [2005] ECR II-3649 (on appeal as Case C-403/05 P, pend-
ing); T-253/02, Ayadi, judgment of 12 July 2006, nyr (on appeal as Case C-403/06 P, pending); 
T-49/04, Hassan, judgment of 12 July 2006, nyr (on appeal as Case C-399/06 P, pending); T-
228/02, OMPI, judgment of 12 Dec. 2006, nyr; and T-362/04, Minin, judgment of 31 Jan. 2007, 
nyr; the interim measures decisions in Cases T-306/01 R, Aden [2002] ECR II-2387 and T-47/03 
R, Sison [2003] ECR II-2047; and the orders in Cases T-206/02, KNK [2005] ECR II-523, T-
229/02, PKK and KNK [2005] ECR II-539 (reversed on appeal in Case C-229/05 P, judgment of 
18 Jan. 2007, nyr) and T-299/04, Selmani [2005] ECR II-20*.
53. A complaint to the European Court of Human Rights against the (then) 15 Member States 
was dismissed as inadmissible on the grounds that Segi could not be considered to be a “vic-
tim” of any breach of the rights set out in the ECHR: Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
(2002–V).
54. Segi order, supra note 50, at para 35.
55. Ibid at para 36.
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pensation (damages liability) within the Third Pillar.56 Furthermore, the CFI 
stated that Article 46(d) TEU (which, as noted above, gives the EU courts 
jurisdiction over human rights matters) does not grant any further jurisdic-
tion over Third Pillar issues.57 Moreover, the Court of First Instance accepted 
that “probably no effective judicial remedy is available to [the applicants], 
whether before the Community Courts or national courts”, as “it would not 
be of any use for the applicants to seek to establish the individual liability 
of each Member State for the national measures enacted pursuant to [the] 
Common Position” and “seeking to establish the individual liability of each 
Member State before the national courts on account of their involvement in 
the adoption of the common positions … is likely to be of little effect”. Nor 
could the validity of the Common Position be challenged indirectly via the 
national courts, with a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice, presum-
ably because – as pointed out above - Article 35(1) TEU does not apply to 
Common Positions. But the CFI concluded that “the absence of a judicial 
remedy cannot in itself give rise to Community jurisdiction in a legal system 
based on the principle of conferred powers, as follows from Article 5 EU”, 
referring to the UPA case in which the Court of Justice refused to widen the 
traditional definition of standing for individuals to bring annulment actions 
against EC measures.58 A Council declaration on the Common Position, con-
cerning the right to compensation, was also waved aside.59 On the other hand, 
the CFI claimed that it did have jurisdiction to hear the case to the extent that 
it involved incursion into the competence of the Community; on this point, it 
rejected the claim on the merits.60
Subsequently the Court of First Instance dismissed two similar annulment 
challenges to the Second Pillar aspects of Common Positions, on similar 
grounds. In the Selmani order, the Court of First Instance did not refer to Ar-
ticle 5 TEU, possible challenges before Member States’ courts, human rights 
issues or the Council declaration.61 In the OMPI judgment, the CFI referred 
again to Article 5 TEU and human rights issues, left open the issue of chal-
lenges before national courts (noting that further implementing measures can 
be and have been challenged, as this case concerned an alleged “internation-
al” terrorist group),62 and distinguished UPA to the extent that that judgment 
56. Ibid at para 34.
57. Ibid at para 37. On human rights and JHA, see further Peers op. cit. supra note 3 at pp. 
64–69. 
58. Segi, order, supra note 50 at para 38, referring to Case C-50/00 P, UPA, [2002] ECR 
I-6677. 
59. Segi, order, supra note 50 at para 39.
60. Ibid at paras 41–47.
61. Selmani (order, supra note 52), paras 52–58.
62. On this point, the CFI was perhaps influenced by the Opinion in the pending Segi appeal 
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stated that the “EC Treaty has established a complete system of legal rem-
edies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the lawfulness of 
acts of the institutions”. Rather for the Second and Third Pillar, the EU Treaty 
has “established a limited system of judicial review, certain areas being out-
side the scope of that review and certain legal remedies not being available”.63 
The Court of Justice has now addressed more fully the control of legal-
ity of Third Pillar measures in its important judgment dismissing the appeal 
against the Segi order of the CFI.64 First of all, the Court ruled that the CFI 
had not erred by refusing to consider Segi’s claim for damages within the 
context of the Third Pillar. In the view of the Court of Justice, the Court’s 
Third Pillar jurisdiction applies, pursuant to Article 46 TEU, “only ‘under 
the conditions provided for by Article 35 EU’”,65 an apparent confirmation 
that the Court’s Third Pillar powers are exhaustively listed in that provision. 
The Court then listed the jurisdiction conferred by Article 35,66 stating that 
“[i]n contrast, Article 35 EU confers no jurisdiction on the Court of Justice 
to entertain any action for damages whatsoever”.67 Furthermore, applying the 
Spain v. Eurojust judgment by analogy, the Court held that Article 41 TEU 
does not make Articles 235 or 288(2) EC applicable to the Third Pillar.68 
Next, the Court addressed the argument concerning the lack of effective 
judicial protection. It began by admitting that, as regards the EU, the Treaties 
have “established a system of legal remedies in which”, referring to Pupino, 
there is “less extensive” jurisdiction for the Court than the EC Treaty pro-
vides for; but the Court did not repeat its earlier statement in Pupino that the 
EU Treaty lacks a complete system to ensure the legality of Third Pillar acts.69 
The Court then explicitly left it to the Member States to take up the ques-
tion of reforming the system, in terms nearly identical to its UPA judgment, 
which solidified the limits on the standing to bring direct actions concerning 
EC measures: 
to the ECJ, which had by then been released; see Opinion in Case C-355/04 P, Segi, infra note 
64; discussed in text at note 79 infra.
63. See OMPI v. Council (judgment, supra note 52), paras 45–60. 
64. Cases C-354/04 P, Gestoras pro Amnistia v. Council, and C-355/04 P, Segi et al. v. 
Council, judgments of 27 Feb. 2007, nyr.
65. Segi judgment at para 44 (emphasis added).
66. Ibid. at para 45. In fact, the Court here omitted to mention that the Court’s jurisdiction to 
rule on disputes over the interpretation or the application of acts adopted pursuant to Art. 34(2) 
TEU as conferred by Art. 35(7) TEU, also extends to disputes between Member States and the 
Commission regarding Conventions.
67. Ibid. at para 46.
68. Ibid. at para 47.
69. Ibid. at para 50.
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“While a system of legal remedies, in particular a body of rules govern-
ing non-contractual liability, other than that established by the treaties 
can indeed be envisaged, it is for the Member States, should the case 
arise, to reform the system currently in force in accordance with Article 
48 EU.”70
However, this preceded, rather than concluded (as in UPA) a more detailed 
discussion of the possibilities open to the applicants. The Court stated that, 
“[a]s is clear from Article 6 EU, the Union is founded on the principle of the 
rule of law and it respects fundamental rights as general principles of Com-
munity law”, so, again paraphrasing UPA, “[i]t follows that the institutions 
are subject to review of their conformity of their acts with the treaties and the 
general principles of law, just like the Member States when they implement 
the law of the Union”.71 This is the first unambiguous statement by the Court 
that the Union is governed by the principle of the rule of law, including the 
corollary principle of judicial review, although it is not clear what the Court 
was referring to as regards review of the Member States’ implementation of 
EU law. Of course this statement by itself does not tell us how such review 
must be carried out. 
To address this point, the Court then moved on, as discussed further be-
low,72 to state that Third Pillar Common Positions were not meant to create 
legal effects upon third parties. This explains why only framework decisions 
and decisions may be subject to annulment actions, and (implicitly) why the 
Court’s jurisdiction over references for a preliminary ruling does not apply to 
common positions, since the latter jurisdiction applies to “all measures ad-
opted by the Council and intended to produce legal effects in relation to third 
parties”. The Court then paraphrased Article 220 EC and stated that “the pro-
cedure enabling the Court to give preliminary rulings is designed to guaran-
tee observance of the law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty,” 
so “it would run counter to that objective to interpret Article 35(1) EU nar-
rowly”. So the right to refer preliminary rulings to the Court “must therefore 
exist in respect of all measures adopted by the Council, whatever their nature 
70. Ibid; cf. para 45 of the UPA judgment (supra note 58). Logically the Court should also 
have mentioned the possible application of Art. 42 TEU, which would have the consequence of 
applying the jurisdictional regime applicable to Title IV EC (which concerns immigration, asy-
lum and civil law: see Art. 68 EC) to Third Pillar matters.
71. Ibid. at para 51; cf. para 38 of the UPA judgment (ibid). The reference to review of the 
Member States is a new point in the Segi judgment as compared to the UPA judgment.
72. See infra section 3.2.
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or form, which are intended to have legal effects in relation to third parties” 
(referring, inter alia, to the ERTA judgment).73 
This means that a common position which goes beyond the bounds of Ar-
ticle 34 TEU because of its content can be reviewed by the Court under the 
preliminary ruling procedure. It follows that: 
“… a national court hearing a dispute which indirectly raises the issue of 
the validity or interpretation of a common position adopted on the basis 
of Article 34 EU, as [in this case], and which has serious doubt whether 
that common position is really intended to produce legal effects in relation 
to third parties, would be able, subject to the conditions fixed by Article 
35 EU, to ask the Court to give a preliminary ruling. It would then fall to 
the Court to find, where appropriate, that the common position is intended 
to produce legal effects in relation to third parties, to accord it its true 
classification and to give a preliminary ruling.”74
It may be that the Court hoped that such a reference might be forthcoming 
from the relevant parallel litigation in the Spanish courts, referred to in the 
Opinion in this case.75 
Next, the Court makes a parallel assertion of its jurisdiction to review such 
measures within annulment proceedings brought by the Commission or a 
Member State pursuant to Article 35(6) TEU.76 This part of the judgment then 
ends with a sweeping final conclusion: 
“Finally, it is to be borne in mind that it is for the Member States and, 
in particular, their courts and tribunals, to interpret and apply national 
procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that 
enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts the law-
fulness of any decision or other national measure relating to the drawing 
up of an act of the European Union or to its application to them and to 
seek compensation for any loss suffered.”77
This statement again echoes the UPA judgment,78 except that the latter judg-
ment had also referred to Member States’ obligation to “establish a system of 
legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective 
judicial protection”, and explained the obligations concerning national proce-
73. Segi judgment, supra note 64, at para 53, referring to Case 22/70, Commission v. Council 
(ERTA), [1971] ECR 263.
74. Segi judgment, supra note 64, at para 54.
75. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi para 17. An appeal was pending before the Tribunal Supremo 
(Supreme Court), which as (presumably) the final court in Spain in this case would have the 
jurisdiction (and, under national law, the obligation) to refer questions to the Court of Justice.
76. Segi judgment, supra note 64, at para 55.
77. Ibid. at para 56.
78. See supra note 58 at para 42.
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dural rules as a consequence of the principle of loyal cooperation. Also, the 
Segi judgment, unlike the UPA judgment, refers to challenges to measures 
concerning the drawing up of EU acts, and furthermore to the right to com-
pensation. 
The judgment in Segi can be compared with the Opinion of the Advo-
cate General, who essentially argued that while the EU was subject to the 
principle of effective control of EU measures, such control effectively rested 
with the national courts, given the lack of jurisdiction of the EU courts over 
damages actions and the limited jurisdiction over preliminary rulings. He ad-
mitted that bringing proceedings through the national courts raised difficult 
issues relating to the choice of defendant (the Union or the Member States), 
the choice of jurisdiction, the possible immunity of the Union and the choice 
and content of the applicable law. In general, the judgment and the Opinion 
reached similar conclusions, except that the Court placed much greater stress 
on the mechanism of preliminary rulings to ensure the legality of Third Pil-
lar measures, while the Opinion laid greater stress on national courts, and 
furthermore addressed in detail the issues that national courts would conse-
quently face. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appeal was inadmissible 
on procedural grounds to the extent that it argued that the Third Pillar mea-
sure encroached upon EC competence, but, as noted below,79 it examined in 
detail the “internal” Third Pillar issue of whether it had been correct to adopt 
a common position as compared to another Third Pillar measure. The Opin-
ion examined the former argument (rejecting it on the merits), but did not 
consider the latter.
The Court’s judgment in this case has obviously tried to strike a difficult 
balance between fidelity to the terms of the Treaties and its apparent desire 
to find a way to ensure effective and uniform control of the legality of EU 
acts. Inevitably there is a conflict between these two objectives in light of the 
wording of the EU Treaty, and it is not possible to satisfy both objectives fully 
at the same time. As compared to the EC Treaty, the Third Pillar provisions 
do not offer a choice for individuals between, on the one hand, a relatively 
effective annulment action (with a corollary jurisdiction under Art. 241 EC, 
and further buttressed by a possible action for damages liability against the 
EC institutions) and on the other hand, a relatively less satisfactory, and often 
more difficult,80 prospect of bringing an indirect action through the national 
79. See infra section 3.2.
80. But it must follow from UPA that challenges via this route should not be impossible. In 
the Jégo-Quéré appeal (Case C-263/02 P, [2004] ECR I-3425, para 35), the ECJ effectively con-
cludes that EC measures should always be open to challenge through the national courts without 
having to contravene them first, even if those measures do not require the adoption of national 
implementing measures which would be open to challenge as such.
898  Peers CML Rev. 2007
courts with a reference to the Court of Justice to challenge the validity of EC 
acts. Rather, in the Third Pillar there is no express jurisdiction for individuals 
to bring annulment actions nor a parallel right to bring damages claims, and 
the ability to bring proceedings via the national courts is obviously curtailed 
by the inability to obtain preliminary rulings in thirteen Member States, and 
the requirement to reach the courts of last instance in another two Member 
States, as pointed out at the beginning of this section.
To address this conflict, the Segi judgment does not take the obvious Cher-
nobyl route of expanding the category of applicants,81 as the Court expressly 
rules out any EU Court jurisdiction over damages liability within the frame-
work of the Third Pillar, and it implicitly appears to rule out jurisdiction over 
direct actions for annulment brought by individuals.82 Nor was it necessary to 
consider in this case expanding the categories of defendants, as the Court did 
in Les Verts,83and evaded doing in Spain v. Eurojust – as mentioned above. 
Rather, it takes the ERTA route of expanding the categories of acts which can 
be challenged within the existing judicial framework, coupled with the UPA 
route of devolving control over the legality of Third Pillar acts to the national 
courts. The problem with this approach is that while the ERTA judgment had 
the effect of further strengthening the relatively effective judicial framework 
of the Community, in the Third Pillar framework not much can be achieved 
by expanding the categories of acts which can be challenged if the would-be 
applicants who might wish to benefit from this still lack the standing to bring 
direct actions. Put another way, what would the ERTA judgment have ac-
complished if the Court had simultaneously reaffirmed provisions of the EC 
Treaty which denied the Commission any standing to sue the Council? True, 
such a judgment would have bolstered the position of Member States to sue 
the Council on such grounds by analogy, but in an institutional framework 
where the Member States have so much political power (by means of their 
de jure veto over EU acts, except for implementing measures), the Member 
States do not need any more legal powers.84
81. See Case C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl), [1990] ECR I-2041. 
Having said that, the Court’s Segi judgment should not necessarily be understood as excluding 
the possibility of expanding (or “interpreting”) its Third Pillar jurisdiction in order to rule on 
actions brought by the European Parliament to protect its prerogatives within the context of the 
Third Pillar, since the Chernobyl judgment was founded on the different principle of the protec-
tion of the Community’s “institutional balance”. 
82. This must follow from the exhaustive nature of Art. 35 TEU (para 34 of the judgment, 
read in combination with paras 35 and 55).
83. Case 294/83, [1986] ECR 1339.
84. The same might even be said of the EC legal order, where Member States generally en-
joyed a de facto First Pillar veto until the mid-1980s.
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This parallel is not quite exact because, unlike individuals in the context 
of the Third Pillar, the Commission cannot bring proceedings against the 
Council in the national courts, whereas the Segi judgment places reliance on 
this route for individual challenges to Third Pillar measures. But of course, 
as noted several times already, on top of the complications that arise in any 
event from use of the national courts to challenge the validity of Commu-
nity measures,85 individuals’ ability to challenge Third Pillar acts indirectly 
through that route is even more problematic. While an EU-wide designation 
of an individual or group as a “terrorist” or a “terrorist” organization could 
presumably be attacked in the national courts of any Member State, so that a 
group or individual which is designated as such can simply search for a Mem-
ber State with jurisdiction to send preliminary rulings to the Court,86 this adds 
a further complication for those affected by EU measures, who will not nor-
mally have the huge resources of multinational companies which often wish 
to challenge Community measures. At least, the Court’s stress on the need to 
interpret national procedural rules to ensure the judicial review of Third Pil-
lar acts must surely mean that standing rules should be interpreted flexibly, if 
necessary, to permit groups and individuals residing in other Member States 
to bring proceedings in Member States where there is the possibility of seek-
ing a preliminary ruling from the Court.87 This must be distinguished from 
the case of Foglia v. Novello, where the Court had particular concerns about 
an attempt to challenge the law of one Member State in the courts of another 
Member State; this is obviously a distinct issue from a challenge to the valid-
ity of Union (or indeed Community) law.88 
Moreover, a pattern has recently become established within the First Pillar 
of a concentration of challenges to EC legislation within the British courts, 
which are apparently sufficiently likely to be sympathetic to the substance 
of arguments challenging the validity of EC law, and subject to sufficiently 
flexible procedural rules, to attract many forum-shopping applicants.89 Of 
course, in the absence of an opt-in to the Court’s jurisdiction by the UK, such 
85. The literature is voluminous; for a cogent critique see the Opinion in UPA, with further 
references, and (implicitly) the CFI judgment in Jégo-Quéré (Case T-177/01, [2002] ECR II-
2365). 
86. The same point could be made of NGOs who wish to bring a challenge to an EU measure, 
cf. Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra note 23).
87. Cf. Joined Cases C-87 to 89/90, Verholen, [1991] ECR I-3757.
88. Cases 104/79, [1980] ECR 745 and 244/80 [1981] ECR 3045.
89. See e.g.: Case C-74/99, Imperial Tobacco, [2000] ECR I-8599; Case C-491/01, BAT, 
[2002] ECR I-11453; Case C-210/03, Swedish Match, [2004] ECR I-11893; Joined Cases C-154 
& 155/04, Alliance for Natural Health and others, [2005] ECR I-6451; Case C-453/02, ABNA, 
[2005] ECR I-10423; Case C-344/04, IATA and others, [2006] ECR I-403; and Case C-308/06, 
Intertanko and others, pending.
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a possibility does not exist within the Third Pillar; there are signs, though, 
that Belgian courts might fill this gap.90 Furthermore, there may be cases 
where an EU measure is applied in practice only to an individual in a par-
ticular Member State (or multiple Member States) which has (or have) not 
opted in to the Court’s jurisdiction. For example, if the UK seeks to execute 
a European arrest warrant issued by another Member State, a person wish-
ing to challenge the underlying validity of the Framework Decision will not 
generally have standing to bring proceedings in a Member State which has 
accepted the jurisdiction. If he or she is “lucky”, the warrant might have been 
issued by a Member State which has opted in to the Court’s jurisdiction, and 
so there might be a procedural possibility to challenge the warrant after its 
execution (or even before its execution, by means of a parallel challenge in 
the issuing Member State). But it is quite possible that the warrant will have 
been issued by one of the twelve other Member States which has not opted in 
to the Court’s jurisdiction, so it is hard to see how a challenge to the validity 
of the Framework Decision in such a case could reach the Court of Justice. In 
some cases, such as a Framework Decision harmonizing substantive criminal 
law, the measure concerned may fall to be applied in each individual Member 
State, with no feasible prospect of shopping for another forum – leaving aside 
the practical difficulties of “shopping” while in detention! 
The most striking aspect of the Court’s ruling in Segi is the absence of any 
mention of the situation in Member States which have not opted in to the 
Court’s preliminary rulings jurisdiction, and in particular the consequences of 
this situation as regards the legality of Third Pillar measures. Since the courts 
in those Member States cannot send references to the Court, it must be pre-
sumed that those courts are a fortiori covered by the obligation to interpret 
and apply national law to allow for challenges to the lawfulness of EU mea-
sures, and to provide for compensation for any loss suffered. Given that those 
courts cannot seek any clarification of the relevant principles from the Court 
of Justice, it would have been helpful to indicate whether there are any com-
mon EU rules on the exercise of these responsibilities, and, if so, what those 
rules are. This would also have simplified the task of those courts which can 
send references. Must the national procedural rules, for instance, be governed 
by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness? Does this entail an obli-
gation to create remedies, for example regarding interim relief and/or dam-
ages? It would obviously be remarkable if national courts had to create the 
very remedy (damage liability for the Union) within national law which the 
Court of Justice refused to create within the law of the Union. Are there any 
90. See Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra note 23) and, as regards the validity of part of a 
directive closely linked to the Third Pillar, see Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones 
and germanophone and others, judgment of 26 June 2007, nyr.
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standard rules governing the issues which were canvassed in the Advocate 
General’s Opinion (choice of defendant, choice of jurisdiction, immunity of 
the Union, and choice and content of law)? For example, must the right to 
seek compensation be governed by rules equivalent to the EC Treaty rules on 
the damages liability of the Community? And what does the Court mean by 
the responsibility for participation in drafting EU measures? It can only be 
hoped that the national courts which can refer questions to the Court take the 
opportunity to do so if these questions arise. 
Those national courts also need to ask whether any of the principles of the 
EC legal order regarding review of EC measures via the national courts (such 
as the consequences of a ruling of invalidity, the Court’s exclusive jurisdic-
tion and the prospect of interim relief in national courts)91 apply to challenges 
to EU measures. It is striking that the Court of Justice did not expressly state 
whether national courts are able to rule against the validity of EU measures 
without a reference to the Court of Justice, or whether there should be a dis-
tinction in this regard between national courts which can send a reference to 
the Court of Justice, and those which cannot. Furthermore, can any conclu-
sions be drawn from the Court’s failure to mention the applicability of the 
principle of loyal cooperation to the national courts’ review of the legality of 
Third Pillar measures, given that the UPA judgment explicitly stresses this 
principle,92 and that the Segi judgment elsewhere mentions the principle in 
the context of the legal effect of Common Positions?93 Then again, the early 
case law setting the foundations of the national courts’ role as regards the le-
gality of Community measures did not mention this principle either.94
Also, the Court should have made more clearly explicit that a Common 
Position which “should” have taken a different form is automatically invalid. 
This must follow from the requirement in Article 39 TEU for the Council to 
consult the EP before the adoption of every EU measure except for Common 
Positions;95 so a “Common Position” which should have been adopted in the 
form of another Third Pillar measure must be invalid for breach of the proce-
91. See, for example, Case 66/80, ICC [1981] ECR 1191, Case 314/85, Foto-Frost [1987] 
ECR 3199, Joined Cases C-143/88 & C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik, [1991] ECR I-415 and Case C-
465/93, Atlanta, [1995] I-3761. On the consequences of invalidity of a directive, see further Case 
C-421/06, Fratelli Martini and Cargill, pending.
92. UPA (judgment, supra note 58) at para 42. See also the appeal judgment in Jégo-Quéré 
(supra note 80), para 32 and Atlanta, supra  note 91, para 46. 
93. See infra section 3.2. The Opinion in the Segi judgment did draw a link between loyal 
cooperation and national courts’ obligations on this point (paras. 106–107).
94. See Foto-Frost etc. (supra note 91), with the exception of Atlanta. 
95. This raises the prospect that the European Parliament has standing to sue to annul Com-
mon Positions which should have taken a different form, on the grounds that the “institutional 
balance” has been affected: cf. supra note 81.
902  Peers CML Rev. 2007
dural requirement to consult the EP.96 Also, in some cases national legisla-
tures may have greater powers over their government’s consent to Third Pillar 
measures, and/or the application of those Third Pillar measures within the 
national legal order, when Framework Decisions or Decisions are adopted, 
rather than Common Positions, as evidenced by the lengthy delay in adoption 
of many Third Pillar measures due to national parliamentary scrutiny require-
ments
2.2. Jurisdiction over Third Pillar matters under the EC Treaty
First of all, there are a number of cases where Community law has an impact 
on national criminal or policing law, for example where national criminal law 
is applied to enforce Community law obligations or has the impact of limit-
ing Community law rights, or where the EC has criminal law competence.97 
Obviously the Court’s EC Treaty jurisdiction is applicable to such cases. That 
jurisdiction is also undeniably applicable to the EC’s staff regulations, as re-
gards staff of the EC institutions whose job concerns Third Pillar matters,98 to 
infringement actions which address Third Pillar issues but which essentially 
concern free movement law,99 or to claims that a First Pillar measure in fact 
falls within the scope of the Third Pillar.100
Secondly, in principle, there may exist a category of “mixed jurisdiction” 
cases, where the Court’s First and Third Pillar jurisdiction may be intertwined, 
raising the question as to which jurisdiction is applicable. This issue has not 
yet been considered by the Court of Justice, and so will not be considered 
further here.101 
96. This assumes that, as in the First Pillar, a breach of the requirement to consult the Europe-
an Parliament invalidates a Third Pillar measure, and that optional consultation of the European 
Parliament is similarly insufficient (see Peers, “Watchmen”, op. cit. supra note 1, 384–385). In 
any event, the European Parliament has never been consulted in practice before the adoption of 
a Common Position. 
97. For details, see Peers (op. cit. supra note 3), 389–402 and also 446–449 and 510–523.
98. This explains the jurisdiction of the CFI to rule on the integration of the staff of the 
Schengen Secretariat into the Council Secretariat: Case T-107/99 R, Garcia de Retortillo v. 
Council [1999] ECR II-1939 (interim measures; the main action was later withdrawn); Joined 
Cases T-164/99, Leroy v. Council, T-37/00, Chevalier-Delanoue v. Council and T-38/00, 
Joaquim Matos v. Council [2001] ECR II-1819; and Case T-166/99, Andres de Dios v. Council 
[2001] ECR II-1857.
99. Case C-503/03, Commission v. Spain [2006] ECR I-1097.
100. See Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, and Case C-102/06 (supra note 7). 
101. I have previously analysed this issue (which also currently arises as regards the distinct 
rules on the Court’s immigration, asylum and civil law jurisdiction) in detail: see Peers, “Watch-
men” (op. cit. supra note 1), 397–399.
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This leaves us with three categories of cases which have been addressed in 
the case law. First of all, it appears clear that the EU Courts normally exercise 
their First Pillar jurisdiction when they consider whether Third Pillar mea-
sures should have been adopted pursuant to the First Pillar, rather than the 
EU Treaty. This can be explained because the jurisdiction of the EU Courts 
to rule in such cases is derived from Article 47 TEU, to which the Court’s EC 
Treaty jurisdiction applies, according to Article 46(f) TEU.102 It follows that 
the EU Courts can receive annulment actions on this issue from any applicant 
listed in Article 230 EC, including the European Parliament and non-privi-
leged applicants (subject to the usual standing rules).103 The EU Courts also 
have jurisdiction to rule on the non-contractual liability of the EU institu-
tions, if they have adopted a Third Pillar measure which should have been 
adopted as a First Pillar measure,104 and it must also follow that all national 
courts and tribunals in all Member States can send preliminary rulings on this 
point to the Court of Justice.105 
The exception to this rule is when such proceedings are brought by the 
Commission or a Member State, whose standing to bring annulment actions 
against Third Pillar measures is governed by the lex specialis of Article 35(6) 
TEU.106 This exception has no practical importance, since (for those appli-
cants) Article 35(6) TEU is identical to Article 230 EC, on the assumption 
that the ancillary rules of the Court’s jurisdiction over annulment actions 
(such as the capacity to grant interim relief) apply also to Third Pillar annul-
ment actions.107 
Secondly, the EU Courts exercise their First Pillar jurisdiction pursuant 
to the EC Treaty rules which are expressly made applicable to the Third Pil-
lar by Article 41 TEU. So the Court of First Instance confirmed (prior to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam) that because the precursor to Article 41 TEU provided 
(as does the present Art. 41) that the Council’s rules of procedure apply to the 
Third Pillar, it followed that the rules on access to Council documents also 
apply, and that the EU courts therefore had jurisdiction pursuant to the EC 
Treaty to rule on disputes concerning access to Third Pillar documents.108
102. See paras. 12–18 of the judgment in Case C-170/96 (supra note 22).
103. See the OMPI judgment and the Selmani order (supra note 52).
104. See the Segi order of the CFI (supra note 50) and the Opinion in the Segi judgment 
(supra note 64); the Court of Justice judgment on the Segi appeal did not address this issue.
105. The Court of Justice has referred to Art. 47 TEU in a reference from a national court: see 
Joined Cases C-64 & 65/96, Uecker and Jacquet, [1997] ECR I-3171, para 23.
106. See Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council (supra note 4).
107. On this point, see Peers, “Watchmen” (op. cit. supra note 1), 386–388.
108. Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet, [1998] ECR II-2289, paras 81–87. The 
Court’s EC Treaty jurisdiction now applies to disputes over access to Third Pillar documents 
pursuant to the reference to Art. 255 EC in Art. 41 TEU.
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Similarly, the EU courts exercise their EC Treaty jurisdiction whenever 
Third Pillar funding is charged to the EC budget, as provided for in Article 41 
TEU. This was first accepted by implication in a case challenging the Com-
mission’s decision to award the tender for the second-generation Schengen 
Information System, although this tender in fact concerned matters within 
both the first and Third Pillars.109 The Court’s jurisdiction was later confirmed 
expressly in Greece v. Commission, a case concerning the plans to construct 
combined embassies for several Member States, along with a representation 
of the Commission, in Nigeria, pursuant to the current Article 20 TEU (a 
Second Pillar provision concerning cooperation between national embassies 
and Commission representations in non-EU countries).110 This project was 
charged to the Community budget, by means of the pre-Amsterdam equiva-
lent of Article 28 TEU (which is the Second Pillar equivalent of Art. 41 TEU), 
and the participating Member States were liable for a share of the project’s 
costs, but Greece pulled out of the project and a dispute arose as to how much 
it owed as a consequence of its participation up to that point. Ultimately, the 
Commission applied the provisions of the EC’s financial regulation which al-
lows Member States’ debts to the EC budget to be “offset” against payments 
from that budget, and Greece challenged this reduction. 
The parties apparently presumed that the EU courts had jurisdiction over 
this dispute, but the Court of First Instance explicitly took the opportunity 
to explain the basis of this jurisdiction. It first noted, as usual, that the EU 
courts’ powers over Second Pillar measures are “exhaustively” listed in Ar-
ticle 46 TEU, which does not give those courts any jurisdiction over Second 
Pillar measures.111 “However”, the Court went on, “it is not disputed that the 
Commission proceeded to recover the disputed amounts by means of an act 
adopted pursuant to the [EC’s financial legislation] so that the act of offset-
ting is covered by Community law. Since such an act is open to challenge 
by way of an action for annulment under Article 230 EC, the Court of First 
Instance has jurisdiction to hear this application.”112 Later on in the judgment, 
the Court pointed out that the EC’s financial legislation “applies only to sums 
falling under the Community budget”, but that “[i]t is not disputed that the 
Commission was authorized, under Article 268 EC, which provides for both 
Community expenditure and certain expenditure occasioned for the institu-
109. Case T-447/04 R, Cap Gemini, [2005] ECR II-257. After this interim measures order, 
the case was withdrawn. In fact, the tender also concerned the Visa Information System project, 
which primarily falls within the scope of the First Pillar.
110. Case T-231/04, Greece v. Commission, judgment of 17 Jan. 2007, nyr. This case con-
cerned the CFSP, but there is no reason to doubt its applicability by analogy to the Third Pillar, 
given the identical wording of Arts. 28(4) TEU and 41(4) TEU.
111. Ibid. at para 73.
112. Ibid. at para 74.
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tions by the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the com-
mon foreign and security policy, to assign to the Community budget the costs 
incurred in respect of the Abuja and Abuja II projects.”113
It should follow that, where Third Pillar funding is charged to the EC bud-
get, annulment actions or actions to establish the EC’s non-contractual li-
ability could also be brought against funding decisions in specific cases, or 
arguably even the general funding legislation, by the European Parliament 
or by non-privileged applicants who meet the standing requirements of Ar-
ticle 230 EC. Actions could also be brought regarding the spending of Third 
Pillar agencies which are funded from the EC budget.114 All of the financial 
provisions of the EC Treaty are applicable mutatis mutandis.115 The applica-
tion of the EC budget rules justifies the Council practice of conferring upon 
the Commission the power to implement Third Pillar measures which charge 
funding to the EC budget.116 
On the other hand, it might appear at first glance that the Court of Justice 
has ruled out the possible application of EC Treaty jurisdiction to the Third 
Pillar by means of Article 41 TEU. It will be recalled that in the Spain v. 
Eurojust judgment, the Court ruled that “Article 41 EU does not provide that 
Article 230 EC is to apply to the provisions on police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, the jurisdic-
tion of the Court in such matters being defined in Article 35 EU, to which 
Article 46(b) EU refers”,117 while in Segi, the Court stated that “Article 41(1) 
EU does not include” Articles 235 or 288 EC among the list of EC Treaty 
Articles which are “applicable” to the Third Pillar.118 In fact, these two judg-
ments are prima facie contradictory, as the Spain v. Eurojust judgment ap-
pears to state that no jurisdiction could arise in principle by virtue of Article 
41, while the Segi judgment appears to assume that it could if the relevant EC 
Treaty articles are listed there. 
There is, however, a way to reconcile these two judgments and the juris-
prudence of the CFI on this issue, because in the Spain v. Eurojust judgment 
the Court was explicitly making the point that Article 41 TEU did not confer 
any more Third Pillar jurisdiction (“the jurisdiction of the Court in such mat-
ters”) on the Court. Certainly, it is true that Article 41, in light of the wording 
of Article 46, cannot confer any further Third Pillar jurisdiction on the Court; 
113. Ibid. at para 111.
114. See Arts. 34–38 of the Eurojust Decision, as amended (O.J. 2002, L 63/1 and O.J. 2003, 
L 245/44), Arts. 15–18 of the European Police College Decision (supra note 37), and Arts. 
41–43 of the proposed Europol Decision (supra note 38).
115. Arts. 246–248 and 268–280 EC.
116. See most recently O.J. 2007, L 7 and 13.
117. Spain v. Eurojust judgment at para 38 (supra note 31).
118. Segi judgment at para 47 (supra note 64).
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rather it applies the EU courts’ First Pillar jurisdiction to the Third Pillar, as 
regards certain institutional matters that do not touch upon the substance of 
Third Pillar measures. So, for instance, the EU Courts’ jurisdiction over ac-
cess to Council documents concerning Europol does not amount to jurisdic-
tion over Europol’s operational activity. 
The third category of cases is where the EC Treaty jurisdiction of the 
Courts applies even in the absence of a reference to the relevant provisions of 
the EC Treaty in Article 41 TEU. Such a jurisdiction as regards staff cases ap-
pears to have been accepted by the Court of Justice in Spain v. Eurojust, even 
though there is no reference to Articles 236 or 283 EC in Article 41 TEU. In 
other words, while the lack of any reference to Article 230 EC in Article 41 
TEU barred any jurisdiction for the EU courts, the absence of any reference 
to Articles 236 or 283 EC in Article 41 TEU did not. 
In order to find an explanation for the ruling of the Court, we first need to 
examine which other EC Treaty provisions besides those listed in Article 41 
TEU or (implicitly) Article 46 TEU apply to the Third Pillar, and in which 
circumstances. To examine the possible application of other EC Treaty Ar-
ticles to the Third Pillar, the most obvious starting point is the Pupino judg-
ment, which, as discussed further below, ruled that the EC Treaty principle 
of loyal cooperation applied to the Third Pillar, despite any express reference 
to it, on the basis that it would be “difficult for the Union to carry out its 
task effectively” without application of that principle. I suggest below that 
this principle could be applied to the other rules governing the legal effect of 
Community law, having regard also to the intention of the authors of the EU 
Treaty not to create a legal system identical to that of EC law.119 
In applying this principle to the institutional rules of the EC Treaty, it is 
also necessary to take into account the EU Treaty requirement of consis-
tency between the activities carried out in the different pillars (Art. 3 TEU), 
weighed against the distinction between the EC and EU Treaties as confirmed 
by Article 5 TEU, which states that the Community institutions “shall exer-
cise their powers under the conditions and for the purposes provided for, on 
the one hand, by the provisions of the [Community Treaties] and, on the other 
hand, by the other provisions of this Treaty.” Article 3 TEU clearly does not 
aim at substantive consistency only, since it obliges the establishment and 
maintenance of a “single institutional framework”. The best way to reconcile 
these provisions, and the underlying tension between the similar objectives 
and tasks of the EC and EU and the intention to create different legal frame-
works in the two treaties, is to accept that Article 3 TEU gives discretion to 
the Council to apply EC Treaty rules to the Third Pillar, even if not required 
119. See infra section 3.2.
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to do so, unless this is ruled out explicitly or by necessary implication by oth-
er provisions, thereby respecting Article 5 TEU. This justifies the Council’s 
powers to extend the EC Treaty staff regulations, and the provisions on im-
munities, to Third Pillar agencies.120 It should be recalled that unlike Article 
46 TEU, Article 41 TEU does not specify that “only” the listed provisions are 
applicable to the EU Treaty.
Furthermore, Article 3 TEU would in exceptional cases even justify a dero-
gation from, or substantial reinterpretation of, Third Pillar provisions which 
expressly rule out the application of EC Treaty institutional rules to the Third 
Pillar, where this is necessary in order to maintain substantive consistency 
and in order for the EU to carry out its Third Pillar tasks effectively. This jus-
tifies the Council’s practice, in spite of the wording of Article 34(2)(c) TEU, 
which appears to confer exclusive powers to adopt measures implementing 
Third Pillar decisions upon the Council,121 nevertheless to confer power upon 
the Commission to adopt rules implementing the Schengen Information Sys-
tem’s “SIRENE Manual” (and further implementing measures in future).122 
This was necessary in order to ensure the uniform adoption of implementing 
measures which apply to both the First Pillar and the Third Pillar, avoiding 
the complications of having two entirely separate procedures to adopt these 
measures. 
This approach to the issue would still entail that many of the institutional 
provisions of the EC Treaty not mentioned in Article 41 TEU would not be 
applicable to the Third Pillar, in cases where the EU Treaty effectively rules 
out the application of these provisions and there is no exceptional case for a 
derogation for the sake of consistency and effectiveness. For example, Article 
302 EC, conferring power upon the Commission to maintain relations on 
behalf of the EC with the United Nations and other international bodies, in 
principle clearly cannot apply to the Third Pillar, as this would clearly contra-
dict Article 37 TEU, which confers such power upon the Council Presidency 
instead. A detailed analysis of each relevant provision of the EC Treaty is 
beyond the scope of this article, but it cannot simply be assumed that any EC 
120. On the staff regulations, see the Spain v. Eurojust case (supra note 31) and supra notes 
38 and 114. On immunities, see Art. 3 of the Police College Decision (supra note 37) and Art. 
50 of the proposed Europol Decision (supra note 38).
121. “[T]he Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt measures necessary to imple-
ment those decisions at the level of the Union”.
122. See the Third Pillar Decision conferring such powers on the Commission (O.J. 2004, L 
64/45), adopted in parallel with Reg. 378/2004 (O.J. 2004, L 64/5), since implemented by the 
adoption of identical Commission Decisions (O.J. 2006, L 317). As for the future, see Art. 67 of 
the agreed text of the SIS II Decision (Council doc. 14914/06, 12 Dec. 2006), which is consistent 
with Art. 51 of the SIS II Regulation (Reg. 1987/2006, O.J. 2006, L 381/4).
908  Peers CML Rev. 2007
Treaty provision is inapplicable simply because it is not listed in Article 41 
TEU.123
This finally brings us back to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction over 
such measures. Logically, as the Court implicitly assumed in Spain v. Euro-
just, the Court’s First Pillar jurisdiction should necessarily apply wherever an 
EC Treaty provision applies to the Third Pillar. An exception might be made 
for the special case of the Commission’s power to adopt substantive Third Pil-
lar rules to implement the current and future Schengen Information System. 
Here, a logically consistent approach would entail application of all of the 
Court’s Third Pillar jurisdiction mutatis mutandis to these Commission mea-
sures, considering in particular that Article 35 TEU does not expressly restrict 
the Court’s jurisdiction to measures adopted by the Council. 
Finally, the last remaining issue is the power of the Court to interpret Title 
I of the EU Treaty (aside from Arts. 6(2) and 7 TEU, where it has express 
jurisdiction), as well as Title VI of the EU Treaty itself, as distinct from acts 
adopted pursuant to it. Article 46 TEU grants the Court jurisdiction over “pro-
visions of Title VI, under the conditions provided for by Article 35”, but Ar-
ticle 35 does not expressly refer to jurisdiction to interpret Title VI of the EU 
Treaty. 
In practice, the Court has interpreted Title VI of the EU Treaty, as well as 
Title I of that Treaty (leaving aside Arts. 6(2) and 7 TEU, over which it has 
express jurisdiction) on several occasions: Articles 1, 34 and 35 TEU in the 
Pupino judgment; Articles 35 and 41 TEU in Spain v Eurojust; Articles 6(1), 
34, 35, 37 and 41 TEU in the Segi judgment; Articles 2, 6(1), 29, 31, 34 and 
35 TEU in the Advocaten voor de Wereld judgment; and Article 2 in three 
Schengen double jeopardy cases, deriving detailed conclusions from the brief 
objective of the EU of “developing an area of freedom, security and justice” 
set out in Article 2.124 The CFI has referred to Article 5 TEU.125 Opinions of 
various Advocates General have referred to EU Treaty rules on even more 
occasions. It might have been thought that the restriction on the Court’s abil-
ity to interpret Title I of the EU Treaty in particular was intended to prevent 
the Court from developing the reasoning that it adopted, for instance, in the 
Pupino judgment, in which (as discussed below) it derived assumptions about 
the legal effect of Third Pillar measures in part by interpreting Article 1 TEU. 
123. E.g. see the Opinion in Segi, which simply assumes on this basis that Art. 307 EC is 
inapplicable to the Third Pillar.
124. See supra notes 23, 31 and 64 respectively. See also supra note 23 Gozutok and Brugge 
at para 36; Miraglia at para 34; and Gasparini, at para 36.
125. Order in Segi (supra note 50).
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Is the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Titles I and VI TEU acceptable? 
Certainly it would be illogical for the Court to be unable to interpret Article 
35 TEU in order to examine whether it has jurisdiction over a case, and the 
power to consider the entire EU Treaty is in effect conferred by the grounds 
of review set out in Article 35(6) TEU (which implicitly applies to references 
on the validity of Third Pillar measures as well), which expressly refer to the 
possible annulment of an EU act for breaching the Treaty.126 In other cases, 
the Court should only exercise such jurisdiction where, by analogy with the 
general rule of interpretation set out above, it is necessary in order to exer-
cise effectively the jurisdiction which has been conferred upon the Court. For 
instance, it was necessary in Pupino to interpret Article 34 TEU in order to 
answer the question referred by the national court regarding the legal effect 
of Framework Decisions, and to interpret Article 1 TEU in order to deal with 
two Member States’ objections to the application of the principle of loyal co-
operation. 
In any case, the Court should be able to interpret the “rule of law” provi-
sion of Article 6(1) TEU. Indeed, the Treaty drafters’ attempt to refuse the EU 
courts any jurisdiction to interpret a treaty provision purporting to guarantee 
the “rule of law” is worthy of a Monty Python script.
3. Judicial protection in the national courts: The legal effect of Third
 Pillar measures
3.1. Framework Decisions: The Pupino judgment
The starting point for any discussion of the judicial protection which national 
courts must secure as regards Third Pillar measures in general, and Frame-
work Decisions in particular, is the Court’s remarkable judgment of June 2005 
in Pupino.127 This case, the first reference from a national court concerning a 
Framework Decision,128 concerns the interpretation and the legal effect of 
provisions of the Framework Decision on crime victims,129 which was the 
126. The Court agreed with this argument explicitly in Advocaten voor de Wereld, paras 
17 and 18 (supra note 23). See also paras. 33 and 34 of the Opinion in that case, and the Segi 
Opinion (supra note 64), para 66.
127. Supra note 23.
128. There have been two subsequent references, one concerning the interpretation of the 
same Framework Decision (Dell’Orto, pending, supra note 23) and one on the validity of the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (Advocaten voor de Wereld, supra note 
23).
129. O.J. 2001, L 82/1.
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second Framework Decision adopted by the Council.130 Article 34(2)(b) TEU 
defines Framework Decisions identically to Directives, except that Frame-
work Decisions “shall not entail direct effect”; an identical exclusion limits 
the legal effect of Third Pillar Decisions. 
The particular Framework Decision at issue in Pupino requires each Mem-
ber State to ensure that “where there is a need to protect victims – particu-
larly those most vulnerable – from the effects of giving evidence in open 
court, victims may, by decision taken by the court, be entitled to testify in a 
manner which will enable this objective to be achieved, by any appropriate 
means compatible with its basic legal principles”.131 There is no definition of 
“vulnerable” victims. 
Italian criminal procedure provides for certain cases where “special ar-
rangements” can be made to hear victims, where the “witness cannot be heard 
in open court by reason of illness or serious impediment”, where a “witness is 
vulnerable to violence, threats, offers or promises of money or other benefits, 
to induce him or her not to testify or to give false testimony”, or concerning 
sexual offences or offences with a sexual background, if the person concerned 
is under 16.132 However, it was not clear whether these provisions were appli-
cable to the case of Mrs Pupino, a nursery school teacher who was accused of 
(non-sexual) violence against several pre-school children in her care, and the 
national court took the view that, in principle, it could not accede to the pub-
lic prosecutor’s request to gather evidence using “special arrangements”. The 
national court therefore asked the Court of Justice whether the Framework 
Decision should “be interpreted as precluding national legislation” such as 
the Italian rules in question.
The Court began its judgment by making several general points relating 
to its jurisdiction.133 It then had to address difficult issues which, although 
they technically concerned the jurisdiction of the Court, in fact concerned 
the legal effect of Third Pillar measures. The French Government argued that 
the Italian court wanted to apply the Framework Decision in place of national 
legislation, whereas Article 34 TEU rules out the direct effect of Framework 
Decisions. As regards the “indirect effect” of Framework Decisions,134 the 
130. As of 10 Apr. 2007, twenty-one Framework Decisions had been adopted, the Council 
had agreed in principle on six more, and four more were under active discussion.
131. Art. 8(4) of the Framework Decision.
132. See Pupino (supra note 23) at para 10. For details of the latter arrangements, see para 
11 of the judgment. 
133. See further supra section 2. 
134. I shall use the populist term “indirect effect” in this paper to refer to the principle of the 
interpretation of national law consistently with EC or EU law. As usual, the Court did not use 
this term in its Pupino judgment.
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French Government argued that interpretation of national legislation in line 
with the Framework Decision was impossible, and in any event would ag-
gravate the position of a defendant in criminal proceedings, which in both 
cases would exceed the possible application of the “indirect effect” principle.135 
Similarly, the Dutch Government argued that if the “indirect effect” principle 
did apply to the Third Pillar, the conditions for its application were not satis-
fied. The Italian government argued that the principle of indirect effect did 
not apply to the Third Pillar, as Framework Decisions and Directives are sep-
arate sources of law; the British and Swedish governments argued similarly 
that the principle could not apply in an intergovernmental framework. 
However, the Court ruled decisively that the principle of “indirect effect” 
applies to the interpretation of national law falling within the scope of Third 
Pillar Framework Decisions. It first observed that “the wording of Article 
34(2)(b) TEU is very closely inspired by that of the third paragraph of Ar-
ticle 249 EC”.136 The binding character of Framework Decisions, since it was 
identical to Article 249 EC, “places on national authorities, and particularly 
national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in conformity” (para 
34). This conclusion was not invalidated merely because the Court’s Third 
Pillar jurisdiction is “less extensive” than its First Pillar jurisdiction, or be-
cause “there is no complete system of actions and procedures designed to 
ensure the legality of the acts of the institutions in the context of ” the Third 
Pillar (para 35). The Court held: 
“Irrespective of the degree of integration envisaged by the Treaty of Am-
sterdam in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 EU, 
it is perfectly comprehensible that the authors of the Treaty on European 
Union should have considered it useful to make provision, in the context of 
Title VI of that treaty, for recourse to legal instruments with effects similar 
to those provided for by the EC Treaty, in order to contribute effectively 
to the pursuit of the Union’s objectives.” (para 36)
Moreover, the “importance” of the Court’s Third Pillar jurisdiction is con-
firmed by the ability of all Member States to submit observations by the 
Court as regards references for a preliminary ruling (para 37). This jurisdic-
tion of the Court “would be deprived of most of its useful effect if individuals 
were not entitled to invoke framework decisions in order to obtain a conform-
ing interpretation of national law before the courts of the Member States” 
(para 38). 
135. On the indirect effect principle, see generally, Prechal, Directives in EC Law, 2nd ed. 
(OUP, 2005), ch. 8, with further references.
136. See Pupino (judgment, supra note 23) at para 33.
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The Court then dealt with the Italian and British objection that the prin-
ciple of indirect effect rested in part upon the principle of “loyal cooperation” 
of Member States as set out in Article 10 EC, and therefore had no parallel in 
the Third Pillar because of the absence of an express provision to that effect 
in Title VI TEU (para 39). It rejected that argument, in light of Article 1 TEU, 
which refers to the EU Treaty as a mechanism for developing an “ever closer 
union” with the task of organizing cooperation in a manner demonstrating 
consistency and solidarity (paras. 40–41). In the Court’s view, 
“It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the 
principle of loyal cooperation, requiring in particular that Member States 
take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of their obligations under European Union law, were not also 
binding in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
which is moreover entirely based on cooperation between the Member 
States and the institutions…” (para 42)
In paragraph 43, the Court concluded decisively that the “indirect effect” 
principle applies to Third Pillar Framework Decisions, although this obli-
gation “is limited by general principles of law, particularly those of legal 
certainty and non-retroactivity” (para 44), which prevent criminal liability 
from being imposed on the basis of a Framework Decision in the absence of 
a national implementing measure.137 However, this limit does not apply where 
the position is aggravated due to a rule of criminal procedure, as distinct 
from substantive criminal law (para 46). Finally, the Court also accepts that, 
as with directives, there is a limit to the principle of “indirect effect” where it 
is impossible for national law to be interpreted consistently with a Framework 
Decision, although it left it to the national court to decide if a conforming in-
terpretation was possible or not in this case (paras. 47–48).
The Court came to the unsurprising finding that in the circumstances of 
the case, pre-school children allegedly maltreated by a teacher had to be con-
sidered “vulnerable” victims (paras. 50–56). However, given the protection 
of human rights in the EU legal order, as set out in Article 6(2), any special 
arrangements applied would nonetheless have to ensure the protection of Mrs 
Pupino’s fundamental right to a fair trial, “as interpreted by the European 
Court of Human Rights” (paras. 57–61). 
The Opinion of the Advocate General in this case examined the legal effect 
issues beginning with the issue of loyalty to the Union. The Opinion, like the 
judgment, concluded that this principle applied to the Third Pillar on the basis 
137. Ibid. at para 45. The Court refers here to parallel case law limiting the legal effect of 
Directives on the same grounds.
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of Article 1 TEU. However, the Opinion also mentioned the obligation in Ar-
ticle 10 EC that Member States must refrain from damaging measures. While 
the Opinion (like the judgment) endorsed the indirect effect of Framework 
Decisions on literal grounds, in doing so it applied (unlike the judgment) the 
Court’s case law on the interpretation of international treaties. Although the 
Opinion accepted that the EU Treaty aimed at a “lesser degree of integra-
tion” than the EC Treaty, due to the different forms of decision-making and 
the limits on the Court’s jurisdiction in the Third Pillar, the Advocate General 
nonetheless concluded that the Third Pillar is a comparable form of integra-
tion entailing a requirement to confer indirect effect upon Framework Deci-
sions. She referred again to the creation of an “ever closer union” according 
to Article 1 TEU, as well as the development of Union “policies”, which “in-
dicates that, contrary to the view of the Swedish Government, the Treaty on 
European Union includes not only inter-governmental cooperation, but also 
joint exercise of sovereignty by the Union.” Also, she referred to the obliga-
tion to “build upon the acquis communautaire” referred to in Article 3 TEU,138 
and she laid stress upon the historical development of the Third Pillar legal 
framework.139 
As for the counter-argument that the Third Pillar did not create a complete 
system of remedies to ensure its legality, the Advocate General responded 
that indirect effect did not create new rules, but presupposes that rules already 
exist. She concluded on this issue by arguing that even if the Framework De-
cision had to be classified as international law, it would have an impact on 
national courts because it was binding upon each Member State. Also, she 
referred to the UK Government’s argument that indirect effect “cannot lay 
claim to the same primacy as Community law and may therefore – pursuant 
to national law – have to give way to other forms of interpretation”, although 
it was not clear if she endorsed this view.140
3.2. Analysis of the Pupino judgment 
How significant is the Court’s judgment in Pupino? Despite its apparently 
radical application of a key Community law principle to an area of law per-
ceived to be intergovernmental, in several respects the Court’s judgment is 
cautious. For one thing, although the Court’s answer concerns indirect ef-
fect, the national court’s question (as the French Government pointed out) 
concerned instead the compatibility of a national rule with the Framework 
138. See Pupino (supra note 23) Opinion of the Advocate General, at para 32.
139. Ibid. at para 33.
140. Ibid. at para 37.
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Decision – which would seem to call for a ruling on the direct effect and/or 
supremacy of Framework Decisions. This alchemy is disguised in the judg-
ment because the Court takes care not to quote the national court’s original 
question. The Court has, in effect, transposed a potential Costa into a mere 
Von Colson. It has been observed that the principle of indirect effect is “in 
general, a relatively mild incursion into the national legal system”.141 Even 
the Court’s judgment on the substance of the Framework Decision is cau-
tious, concluding only that a certain category of children must be considered 
to be “vulnerable” crime victims.142
Furthermore, the Court did not set out many general conclusions about the 
legal order of the Third Pillar, but rather confined itself largely to address-
ing the very specific question of the legal effect of framework decisions. 
The reasoning begins with a literal, textual comparison of Articles 249 EC 
and Article 34(2)(b) TEU, goes on to reject a counter-argument based on the 
Court’s limited Third Pillar jurisdiction, and then interprets the Treaty in light 
of the intention of the authors regarding the creation of framework decisions, 
leaving aside the question of “the degree of integration envisaged” by the 
creation of “an ever closer union” in accordance with Article 1 TEU. The only 
teleological point made is the effectiveness of the Court’s jurisdiction, which 
is linked to an individual entitlement to invoke direct effect before national 
courts; the Court passed up the opportunity to describe this as an individual 
right. However, it should be noted that this line of reasoning appears to as-
sume that the Community law principle of effectiveness (or a variation of it) 
applies to the Third Pillar.
It is hard to see how any of these points could be seen as radical. A stan-
dard black-letter interpretation of Article 34(2)(b) TEU suggests that since 
this provision is identical to the definition of directives in Article 249 EC 
except for the exclusion of direct effect (a principle which is course not men-
tioned in Art. 249, but instead was developed by the Court), then by a con-
trario reasoning, every other rule relating to the legal effect of directives 
is applicable to the legal effect of framework decisions. This could be con-
firmed by the principle of consistency as set out in Article 3 TEU, the unified 
general objectives of the Union, and the particular link between the Commu-
nity law aspects of “freedom, security and justice” and the Third Pillar as-
pects of this area of law. This rule could even be regarded as a subset of a 
general rule of interpretation of the Third Pillar provisions of the Treaty in 
light of the First Pillar provisions “as far as possible” in light of the same 
141. Prechal (op. cit. supra note 135), at p. 180.
142. Cf. the Opinion in Pupino, which concluded that all children were “vulnerable” victims 
of crime.
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arguments, an interpretation which can be defended by the canons of inter-
pretation of international law, without resorting to the Court’s controversial 
approach to the legal effect of Community law.143 This first line of the Court’s 
analysis not only avoids any general statement about the Third Pillar, as noted 
above, but even avoids any general statement about the legal effect of Frame-
work Decisions, addressing only the question of their indirect effect. 
The interpretation of the Treaty by reference to the intentions of the au-
thors gives primacy to the Member States as masters of the Treaties, and its 
application to the facts can easily be defended. Since the Treaty drafters con-
sciously decided to define the legal effect of framework decisions by copying 
the definition of directives in the EC Treaty, with the sole specific exclusion 
of the direct effect of framework decisions, they can reasonably be presumed 
to have deliberately chosen to align the legal effect of the two instruments 
with the sole exception of direct effect, since they obviously turned their 
minds to the issue of divergences between the legal effect of the two instru-
ments but chose only to draw a single distinction. 
As for the argument about the absence of a complete system for control-
ling the legality of Third Pillar acts, it is hard to see how it is relevant to the 
question of the legal effect of Third Pillar acts, since the principle of a com-
plete system of remedies was developed by the Court of Justice in the context 
of the separate question of challenges to the validity of EC acts,144 long after 
the seminal judgments in Van Gend and Costa, which make no reference to 
such a principle.145 So it makes sense for the Court of Justice to reject this ar-
gument out of hand. In contrast, the Advocate General’s response to the argu-
ment is, with respect, confusing, although this matters little since the original 
argument is irrelevant. 
However, the Court of Justice also refers to the rather stronger argument 
that the Court’s jurisdiction is less extensive as regards the Third Pillar than 
the first. This could perhaps be understood as an a contrario reference to 
the reasoning in the Van Gend judgment, when the Court referred to the 
existence of the Court’s jurisdiction over preliminary rulings as a secondary 
argument for concluding that EC law “has an authority which can be invoked 
by [Member States’] nationals before [national] courts and tribunals”. The 
Pupino judgment in effect is a variation upon this theme, when it concludes 
that the effectiveness of the Court’s Third Pillar jurisdiction over preliminary 
rulings would be nullified in the absence of indirect effect. The limits on the 
143. For details of this suggested approach, see Peers, “Watchmen” (op. cit. supra note 1), 
365–374. 
144. See particularly Les Verts (supra note 83) and UPA (supra note 58).
145. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 3 and Case 6/64, Costa, [1965] ECR 585.
916  Peers CML Rev. 2007
Court’s jurisdiction (i.e. national opt-outs) are explained away by concluding 
that the importance of the preliminary ruling jurisdiction is confirmed by the 
ability of all Member States to submit observations in Third Pillar references 
before the Court. This line of reasoning is also convincing as far as it goes, 
since it is hard to see what the point of the Court’s jurisdiction would be in 
the absence of direct or indirect effect. Certainly the Court does not go so far 
as to derive from this point, as it did in Van Gend, the existence of a “new le-
gal order of international law for the benefit of which the States have limited 
their sovereign rights.” In fact, the Court does not derive any conclusion from 
this besides the principle of indirect effect. Nor, unlike Van Gend, does the 
Court make any reference to the preamble of the Treaty or the creation of its 
institutions. The Court also passed over the opportunity to approve or develop 
the points made by the Advocate General as regards the historical develop-
ment of the Third Pillar, the creation of EU policies, the “joint exercise of 
sovereignty” by the Member States, and the implications of Article 3 TEU.
The more radical line of the Court’s reasoning concerns the application 
of the principle of “loyal cooperation” to the Third Pillar, an issue which the 
Court appears to address only as an answer to the counter-argument put forth 
by the UK and Italy. In other words, the Court could, and probably (given its 
caution in the rest of the judgment) would, have ruled for the indirect effect 
of framework decisions without any need to examine the question of whether 
there is a principle of “loyal cooperation” governing the Third Pillar. So the 
UK and Italy only managed to give the Court the opportunity to invoke a 
further line of reasoning in favour of the indirect effect of Framework Deci-
sions and which has fundamentally weakened the conception of the Third Pil-
lar as an “intergovernmental” legal order, both as regards the legal effect of 
EU measures and more generally, as regards the existence of the basic rules 
underpinning that legal order. To invoke a football analogy, these Member 
States have not merely accidentally scored an own goal, but rather acciden-
tally started playing for the other side.
In developing this line of reasoning, the Court does derive from the prin-
ciple of “ever closer union” and the vague tasks referred to in Article 1 TEU 
a principle not expressly referred to in the Third Pillar provisions of the EU 
Treaty, which, by black-letter reasoning, therefore should not apply to the 
Third Pillar. Again, the Court refers to the effectiveness principle, this time 
as regards carrying out the Union’s task, and concludes in effect that one as-
pect of Article 10 EC is applicable to the Third Pillar (the requirement to take 
measures to ensure fulfilment of obligations). It should be noted, however, 
that the Court makes no reference to the other aspects of Article 10 EC (the 
obligation to facilitate achievement of the EC’s tasks and the requirement 
to abstain from any measure which would facilitate the attainment of the 
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objectives of the Treaty), although the obligation for Member States to take 
appropriate measures to fulfil their obligations to which the Court refers is 
expressly non-exhaustive (as indicated by the Court’s use in para 42 of the 
words “in particular”). Furthermore, the Court’s reliance upon the Union’s 
tasks in the Pupino judgment can be compared to its reference to the Com-
munity’s objectives in the Van Gend judgment. 
The implication of the Court’s reasoning here is not only that other as-
pects of the Court’s principles concerning the legal effect of EC law derived 
from the principle of loyal cooperation and/or the principle of effectiveness 
could be transposed to the Third Pillar, but also that other EC law principles 
not expressly applicable to the Third Pillar could nevertheless be applicable 
to it by virtue of a link to the concept of developing an “ever closer union” 
and the Union’s very general tasks as set out in Article 1 TEU. In short, the 
broad scope of this second line of reasoning in the Pupino judgment leaves 
most questions regarding the legal order of the Third Pillar wide open. It is 
not even clear on what basis the Third Pillar should be interpreted: by refer-
ence to the Treaty text and the intention of the authors? By reference to the 
effectiveness of the Court’s jurisdiction? Or, by reference to the effective-
ness of carrying out the EU’s task, in the context of developing an “ever 
closer union”? The issue is obviously complicated because most of the gen-
eral principles of EC law and the rules concerning the legal effect of EC law, 
and many of the rules governing the functioning of the EU’s institutions and 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (including the EC law obligations of 
national courts), have been developed by the Court in the absence of written 
rules – or sometimes even in spite of the written rules which do exist. More-
over, it would presumably be open to the Court to look at other provisions in 
the EU Treaty as grounds for arguments concerning the legal effect of EU 
law, such as the preamble and the objectives of the EU as set out in Article 2 
TEU (paralleling the approach in Van Gend). In fact, the Court has already 
drawn detailed and far-reaching assumptions about the substantive law of the 
Third Pillar from the general provisions of Article 2.146 For example, recog-
nizing the principle of direct effect of Third Pillar measures would bolster the 
effectiveness of the EU’s tasks and of the Court’s jurisdiction, but (as regards 
framework decisions and decisions) it would manifestly breach the text of 
the EU Treaty. Recognizing the principle of supremacy of EU law within the 
Third Pillar would again bolster the effectiveness principle, and would not 
expressly violate the text of the EU Treaty, which is silent on this issue (as is 
the EC Treaty). But could it seriously be contended that the authors of the EU 
Treaty intended to provide for the supremacy of EU law in the Third Pillar? 
146. See the references in supra note 124.
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It might be tempting to rely upon the Court’s recognition of the existence 
of the principle of loyal cooperation in the Third Pillar to argue that at least 
the EC law principles related to that rule should be applicable. But in the case 
law, the principle of loyal cooperation is closely intertwined with other fun-
damental rules relating to the legal effect of EC law. Separating these differ-
ent rules is no easier than separating the distinct eggs in an omelette. So, for 
example, in Factortame I, the Court freely mixes the application of Article 10 
EC with the principle of direct effect, ruling that it is for “national courts, in 
application of the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC 
Treaty, to ensure the legal protection which persons derive from the direct ef-
fect of provisions of Community law”.147 The judgment subsequently refers 
to the effectiveness of EC law and the effectiveness of the preliminary rulings 
procedure, two points relied upon in the Pupino judgment,148 but Factortame 
also refers earlier to the principle of the primacy of EC law.149 In fact, the 
wording of the Factortame judgment suggests that it is interim relief, rather 
than the principle of supremacy as such, which flows from Article 10 EC. 
Along the same lines, the judgment in Simmenthal does not refer to Article 
10 EC at all, instead relying mainly on primacy and direct effect, but it does 
make ancillary points about the effectiveness of EC law and the Court’s juris-
diction.150 The initial assertion of EC law supremacy in Costa relies largely 
on general statements by the Court about the nature of EC law, backed up by 
references to the objectives of the Treaty, the limited prospect for derogations, 
and the legal effect of regulations.151 As noted above, the first of these points 
could be applied by analogy to the Third Pillar.
The principle of indirect effect itself was initially developed primarily by 
reference to Article 10 EC.152 The principle of damages liability for breach 
of Community law, however, was developed primarily by reference to the 
creation of the EC as a new legal order, along with the obligation of national 
courts to protect EC law and the effectiveness of EC law rights; as a purely 
ancillary point, the Court concluded that “[a] further basis for the obliga-
tion of Member States to make good such loss and damage is to be found in 
147. Case C-213/89, [1990] ECR I-2433, para 19.
148. Pupino (judgment, supra note 23) paras 21 and 22.
149. Supra note 147 at para 18.
150. Case 106/77, [1978] ECR 629.
151. See also Van Gend (supra note 145).
152. See para 26 of the judgment in Case 14/83, Von Colson, [1984] ECR 1891, referred to 
in the other key judgments on indirect effect (see e.g. Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] 
ECR 3969, para 12; Case C-106/89, Marleasing, [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8; Joined Cases C-
397–403/01, Pfeiffer, [2004] ECR I-8835, para 110).
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Article [10] of the Treaty”.153 But when the Court decisively ruled against the 
horizontal direct effect of directives, it referred to the principles of indirect 
effect (as derived from Art. 10 EC) and damages liability as alternative meth-
ods of ensuring the effectiveness of EC law.154
As for other issues related to the effectiveness of EC law, the Court has 
linked the entire doctrine of effectiveness and equivalence of national rules to 
Article 10 EC,155 in particular in the context of revoking prior administrative 
decisions when certain conditions are met.156 
To what extent do the Third Pillar provisions of the EU Treaty ensure ef-
fective judicial protection for individuals in the context of the legal effect of 
EU measures? The best way forward on this issue would be to strike a balance 
between the conflicting approaches based on the wording and the intention of 
the authors of the Treaty on the one hand, and the effectiveness and systemic 
considerations (based on the preamble, the task and objectives of the Union 
and the creation of EU institutions) on the other. In particular, the starting 
point must be that the intentions of the authors of the EU Treaty (even fol-
lowing the Treaty of Amsterdam) were surely that the full extent of the Com-
munity legal order would not apply to the Third Pillar of the EU. This must 
at least be true where the express wording of the EU Treaty rules out such an 
application (as regards the role of the political institutions, the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice, and the direct effect of framework decisions and deci-
sions), but also as regards the most fundamental aspects of the relationship 
between national law and Community law. 
This is confirmed by a literal interpretation, for if the Treaty authors had 
actually intended all aspects of the Community legal order to apply to the 
Third Pillar, then why did they draw up a separate EU Treaty at all? It would 
certainly have been possible to provide for an institutional and jurisdictional 
“ghetto” in the midst of the EC Treaty, as proved by Title IV of Part Three 
of that Treaty (concerning immigration, asylum and civil law). In fact, the 
“transfer” of parts of the Third Pillar to the First Pillar by the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, and the existence of passerelle clauses in Title VI TEU (former Art. 
K.9 TEU, and current Art. 42 TEU) which are made subject to national ratifi-
153. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, [1991] ECR I-5357, particularly para 36.
154. Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, [1994] ECR I-3325, particularly para 19. The judgment 
makes no reference to the supremacy of EC law.
155. See Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck, [1995] ECR I-4599, para 12.
156. See Case C-453/00, Kühne and Heitz, [2004] ECR I-837, para 27. In comparison, the 
Opinion in this case begins by applying the principles of primacy and direct effect, and only sub-
sequently mentions Art. 10 EC, with reference to Case C-213/89, Factortame and Others [1990] 
ECR I-2433, para 20 and Francovich (supra note 153).
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cation procedures,157 rather than a provision which simply confers the power 
to amend the decision-making and jurisdiction rules pursuant to a less oner-
ous procedure,158 confirms that the authors of the EU Treaty, past and present, 
conceived that there were fundamental differences between the EC and EU 
legal orders. 
This interpretation is confirmed by the wording of Article 1 TEU, which 
specifies that while the Union is “founded upon” the Communities, the Com-
munities are “supplemented by the … forms of cooperation established by” 
the EU Treaty, and by Article 5 TEU, which distinguishes clearly between the 
EC institutions “exercising their powers under the conditions” of the Commu-
nity Treaties on the one hand, and the EU Treaty on the other. Such wording 
points unmistakeably to the intention to create a distinct legal order.
It must follow that the principle of supremacy does not apply to the Third 
Pillar, and neither does the corollary principle of direct effect or the closely 
connected obligation to set aside national law (a fortiori national constitu-
tional provisions) in order to apply Community law. If these principles ap-
plied to the Third Pillar, the essential distinctions between the First and Third 
Pillar would be lost, and the intentions of the Treaty authors would clearly be 
ignored. This is true as regards the direct effect of conventions as well, even 
though such a legal effect is not expressly excluded. To reverse the reason-
ing of Van Duyn,159 it does not follow that the direct effect of conventions is 
applicable merely because direct effect is only excluded as regards the other 
measures listed in Article 34 TEU. Similarly, it cannot seriously be argued, to 
get around the exclusion of direct effect, that Third Pillar measures benefit 
from the subtly different concept of direct applicability.
It might be argued that this interpretation would limit the effectiveness 
of EU law. This objection is indisputably correct. But there is a trade-off 
between effectiveness and sovereignty. The clear indications are that the 
Member States accepted, at least for the time being, that a reduction in the ef-
fectiveness of EU law was a price worth paying for increased sovereignty, and 
the corresponding increased discretion of national governments and increased 
accountability to and increased powers of national parliaments and courts. 
Put simply, Member States wanted less integration in this area. 
However, it does not follow that Member States wanted the Third Pillar 
to be entirely ineffective. In particular, as argued in the Pupino opinion, the 
substantial amendments made to the remaining Third Pillar by the Treaty 
157. It is striking that these provisions permit a possible transfer to the First Pillar, not merely 
a possible change to the decision-making process within the Third Pillar.
158. Cf. Art. 67(2) EC, which was negotiated in parallel with Art. 42 TEU.
159. Case 41/74, [1974] ECR 1337.
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of Amsterdam may be understood as a significant step in that direction. It 
is therefore appropriate to recognize the application of the less fundamental 
principles of Community law to the Third Pillar. Chief among these is the 
principle of indirect effect, which can, for the reasons already pointed out, 
be justified not only in light of the principles of effectiveness of EU law and 
the Court’s jurisdiction, but also in light of the wording of the Treaty and the 
authors’ intentions. Furthermore, the Third Pillar legal order should be un-
derstood to comprise the other secondary rules concerning the legal effect of 
Community measures, in particular the specific applications of the principle 
of effectiveness (except for the disapplication of national legislation), most 
particularly the principle of liability for damages. Although the principle of 
liability for damages can operate to protect directly effective rights,160 it was 
initially developed in the context of protecting rights which were not directly 
effective,161 and has been used by the Court, along with indirect effect, as 
a form of compensation for the lack of (horizontal) direct effect.162 Simi-
larly the more general requirement to ensure that national law giving effect to 
Community law rules is governed by the twin principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence is apt for application to the Third Pillar.163 The application of the 
“loyal cooperation” principle to ensure the enforcement of Community law 
against individuals is even more apt for transposition to the Third Pillar, be-
cause one of the main objectives of the Third Pillar is to ensure that persons 
are prosecuted or investigated by Member States, or that one Member State’s 
criminal law decisions are applicable in other Member States.164
There is no reason that any of these principles should be subject to a differ-
ent interpretation than that applied in the context of EC law. This is already 
clear as regards indirect effect, as the judgment in Pupino strongly implies, 
in light of the Court’s reliance on the nearly identical definition of directives 
and framework decisions, its reference to interpretation in light of “the whole 
of national law”,165 and the reference to the principle of loyal cooperation in 
160. See Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Factortame III and Brasserie de Pecheur, [1996] ECR 
I-1029.
161. See Francovich, supra note 153.
162. See Faccini Dori, supra note 154 and generally Prechal (op. cit. supra note 135), ch. 
10.
163. The Opinion in Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra note 23), para 56, expressly suggests 
that the case law on the relationship between EC law and national procedural law applies to the 
Third Pillar. On these principles, see Prechal (ibid), ch. 9, and most recently the judgment of 13 
March 2007 in Case C-435/05, Unibet, nyr.
164. See e.g. the important judgments in Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 
2965, Case C-265/95, Commission v. France, [1997] ECR I-6959 and Case C-94/00, Roquette 
Frères, [2002] ECR I-9011, all of which mention Art. 10 EC.
165. Para 47 of the judgment, implicitly referring to Pfeiffer (supra note 152).
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all of the key judgments which concern the indirect effect principle.166 It fol-
lows that national courts are obliged to interpret both prior and subsequent 
national law in light of a framework decision, as established in Marleasing.167 
The Commission’s detailed arguments about the extent of Member States’ ob-
ligations to legislate to give effect to framework decisions must also be cor-
rect.168 Of course, it should be noted, that unlike the principle of the indirect 
effect of directives, which largely applies to relations between private parties, 
the indirect effect of framework decisions will, in the absence of direct effect 
and given the subject-matter of the Third Pillar, largely be relevant to the rela-
tions between individuals and state authorities. Having said that, there will 
be a few cases in which framework decisions govern the relations between 
individuals.169
It might be objected that the Community law principles of liability for the 
errors of national judiciaries, and the obligation to reopen prior administra-
tive decisions,170 should not apply to the Third Pillar, because these obliga-
tions are linked closely to the obligation for final courts to refer any pending 
EC law questions to the Court of Justice, which does not generally apply to 
the Third Pillar.171 However, the application of these principles to the Third 
Pillar should nonetheless be reaffirmed, since it is clear from Pupino that all 
national courts have obligations to apply Third Pillar measures, whether they 
have the capability to refer questions to the Court of Justice or not. Surely the 
binding nature and legal effect of EU measures cannot differ depending on 
whether the Court has jurisdiction over preliminary rulings, or the extent of 
that jurisdiction.
Alternatively, a supporter of a more integrationist analysis might argue that 
it makes no sense to apply the secondary principles of Community law with-
out also applying the principles of supremacy and direct effect. But there are 
prior examples of this in EC law, as regards the lack of horizontal direct effect 
166. See supra note 152.
167. Ibid.
168. See, for instance, the report on the application of the Framework Decision on facilita-
tion of illegal entry (COM(2006)770, 6 Dec. 2006, pp. 4–5) and Prechal (op. cit. supra note 
135), ch. 5.
169. For example, the obligation in the Framework Decision on crime victims’ rights for 
offenders to compensate crime victims, which is at issue in the pending Dell’Orto case (supra 
note 23).
170. Kühne and Heitz (supra note 156) and Case C-224/01, Köbler, [2003] ECR I-10239.
171. It is worth remarking in passing on the remarkable dynamics of the Kühne and Heitz 
judgment (supra note 156). Rather than relying on the national courts to enforce Community law 
against recalcitrant national administrations, as it has so many times in the past, in this case the 
ECJ enjoins national administrations to enforce Community law in spite of recalcitrant national 
courts.
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of directives, which appears to rule out the prospect of setting aside national 
law (a key element of the supremacy principle),172 and the legal effect of the 
law of the World Trade Organization within the scope of EC law (supremacy 
without direct effect, but with indirect effect).173 
It is not necessary, in order to reach the conclusions I have suggested 
above, to determine whether the Third Pillar of the European Union consti-
tutes a “new legal order” in international law, as several advocates general 
have done.174 In fact, it may be tactically unwise for the Court to rule on this 
question either way: a positive ruling on this point could aggravate some na-
tional courts and some part of public and political opinion, while a negative 
ruling might result in national courts overlooking the legal effect of Third Pil-
lar legislation, despite the ruling in Pupino. On the other hand, an academic 
opinion on this point is surely harmless! In my view, applying the analysis in 
Van Gend, the Union can indeed be considered a “new legal order”, in light 
of the preamble of the EU Treaty, the tasks and objectives of the Union and 
the roles of the institutions, including the Court. Even so, it does not follow 
that the Union shares all of the characteristics of the Community legal order, 
for all of the reasons set out above. It should be concluded that the Union and 
the Community are parallel and intertwined legal orders, sharing some essen-
tial characteristics but differing as regards the application of some important 
rules concerning the relationship between EC/EU and national law, because 
of the lesser degree of integration in the Third Pillar.
Finally, it may be useful to give some concrete examples of how these ab-
stract principles might work. To date the Court has only had the opportunity 
to develop its case law beyond a single case in one substantive area of the 
Third Pillar, namely the cross-border double jeopardy principle.175 All of the 
cases up to the present have concerned the substance of that principle, rather 
than procedural issues relating to its application. But it is certainly possible 
that, since the Court’s judgments in this area often require changes in national 
practice, there are persons who have been or will be wrongly detained, con-
victed and/or prosecuted in breach of the Court’s interpretation of the double 
jeopardy rules. While there is no obligation upon national courts to set aside 
any national legislation in breach of the Court’s interpretation of the double 
172. See the Opinion of 11 Feb. 2007 in Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa, pending.
173. See: Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany, [1996] ECR I-3989 (supremacy); Case 
C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 and Joined Cases C-300 & 392/98, Dior and 
others, [2000] ECR I-11307 (no review of EC acts in light of WTO measures; lack of direct ef-
fect of WTO measures); and Case C-53/96, Hermès, [1998] ECR I-3603 (indirect effect).
174. See the Opinions in Gasparini, supra note 23, para 81 and Advocaten voor de Wereld, 
supra note 23, para 43.
175. See supra notes 20 and 23.
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jeopardy rules, it still follows that such national legislation must be, as far 
as possible, interpreted in light of those rules as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice. Wrongful detention, prosecution and conviction connected to the 
double jeopardy rules should be compensated in accordance with the prin-
ciples established as regards Community damages liability.176 National pro-
cedural rules limiting challenges to detention or prosecution, or proceedings 
to set aside a conviction, where they are connected to the double jeopardy 
rules, must be subject to scrutiny in light of the principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence.177 
Similar arguments could be made as regards the provisions for remedies in 
the EU legislation on mutual recognition in criminal matters.178 The legal ef-
fect of Third Pillar measures in national law would be particularly relevant if 
the Commission’s proposed framework decision on the rights of suspects and 
defendants were adopted by the Council.179
3.3. Common Positions: The Segi judgment 
The Court of Justice has also ruled on the legal effect of Common Posi-
tions, in the recent Segi judgment.180 In the framework of cases demanding 
compensation for being listed as “terrorists” in a Third Pillar Common Posi-
tion,181 the Court ruled that Article 34 TEU provided for the adoption of acts 
“varying in nature and scope”. In its view, “[a] common position requires 
the compliance of the Member States by virtue of the principle to cooperate 
in good faith, which means in particular that Member States are to take all 
appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of 
their obligations under European Union law [referring to Pupino]”. Article 
37 TEU “thus” requires the Member States to defend common positions at 
the international level, but “a common position is not supposed to produce of 
itself legal effects in relation to third parties”. This “explains why” common 
positions cannot be the subject of actions for annulment or references for a 
preliminary ruling.182
176. As regards wrongful detention, Art. 5(5) ECHR is also relevant. As regards wrongful 
conviction, see also Art. 3 of the Seventh Protocol to the ECHR.
177. Again, Art. 5 ECHR is relevant to proceedings relating to detention.
178. See Art. 11 of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (O.J. 2002, L 
190/1) and Art. 11 of the Framework Decision on freezing orders (O.J. 2003, L 196/45).
179. COM (2004) 328, 28 April 2004.
180. Supra note 64. See also para 40 of the Advocaten voor de Wereld judgment (supra note 
23).
181. For further details of the judgment, see supra section 2.
182. See Segi judgment, supra note 64, at paras. 52 and 53.
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The Court should be praised for identifying the key issue in this case, 
which was the comparison between common positions and other types of 
Third Pillar act, given the impact of designating a person or a group as a “ter-
rorist” and the non-existent parliamentary and (particularly) judicial control 
over common positions as compared to other Third Pillar measures. Although 
Article 34 TEU does not expressly rule out the legal effect of common posi-
tions upon third parties, it is surely right to rule out such a legal effect as a 
matter of policy, as it is objectionable in principle that a Third Pillar measure 
having effects upon individuals could be immune from any prospect of judi-
cial control by the Court of Justice, if only through the limited remedy of the 
prospect of preliminary ruling on its validity from the courts of barely half of 
the Member States. 
The Court should furthermore have concluded that Third Pillar common 
positions are not binding at all, except where Article 37 TEU expressly pro-
vides for this,183 by comparing Article 34(2)(a) TEU with the other provi-
sions of Article 34(2) and also with Article 15 TEU, which clearly provides 
for a binding effect of Second Pillar common positions. But instead the Court 
clearly accepts that Common Positions are binding upon Member States, and 
arguably by implication that they are also binding upon EU institutions. 
As a consequence of this ruling, it may be doubted whether the Third Pil-
lar Common Positions labelling persons and groups as “terrorists”, and con-
cerning the transfer of personal data to Interpol, were validly adopted. On 
the other hand, the common positions concerning coordination of Member 
States’ positions during international negotiations are clearly valid.184 
It is striking that despite the lack of legal effect of common positions on 
third parties, the principle of loyal cooperation nonetheless applies to such 
measures. This confirms that the principle of loyal cooperation is binding on 
the entire framework of Third Pillar cooperation, not just when the Council 
adopts framework decisions. It also confirms that the principle has a practical 
impact besides that of indirect effect of framework decisions, although the 
Court of Justice will rarely, if ever, have a chance to elaborate on the practi-
cal impact of that principle as far as common positions are concerned.185 
183. Art. 37 TEU states that “[w]ithin international organizations and at international con-
ferences in which they take part, Member States shall defend the common positions adopted 
under the provisions of this Title”. 
184. For details of the adopted Common Positions, see Peers (op. cit. supra note 6), 36–37.
185. It will be recalled (see supra section 2) that the Court has jurisdiction according to Art. 
35(7) TEU over conflicts between Member States as regards the interpretation or application of 
(inter alia) Common Positions; but it has no other jurisdiction over them, except to rule that they 
should have been adopted in some other form. 
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Finally, it follows from Pupino and Segi that other Third Pillar measures 
(conventions and decisions) are also governed by the principle of loyal co-
operation. The Court of Justice has not yet been called to rule on their legal 
effect, but logically, where relevant, it should be identical to the legal effect 
of framework decisions.
4. General principles of Community law
The general principles of Community law have had a significant impact on 
the development of the Community legal order, serving as important rules 
ensuring the judicial protection of individuals in the context of the validity 
and interpretation of Community acts.186 But do these principles apply to the 
Third Pillar? 
The Court has not expressly stated that all general principles of EC law 
apply to the Third Pillar. Starting with the best known of the general prin-
ciples, the protection of human rights, as noted above, is expressly referred 
to in Article 6(2) TEU, which has been applied by the Court in its judgments 
in Pupino, Segi and Advocaten voor de Wereld.187 In Pupino, the Court ex-
pressly stated that Third Pillar measures had to be interpreted in light of 
human rights principles, including the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights. In Advocaten voor de Wereld, the Court confirmed that 
within the Third Pillar the human rights principles are also applicable when 
considering the validity of EU law188 and the national application of EU law.189 
There can surely be little doubt that the principles apply as regards national 
derogations from EU law.190 
The Pupino judgment also stated that the obligation placed upon national 
courts to apply the principle of indirect effect “is limited by general princi-
ples of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity”.191 This 
186. See generally Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2006).
187. Paras. 58–60 of the Pupino judgment (supra note 23) and para 51 of the Segi judgment 
(supra note 64). On the details of this general principle, see Tridimas (ibid.) ch. 7.
188. Para 45 of the Advocaten voor de Wereld judgment (supra note 23).
189. This also can be considered implicit in para 60 of the Pupino judgment (supra note 
23).
190. Although most judgments on this point concern the application of the human rights 
principles to national derogations from internal market law (case law beginning with Case C-
260/89, ERT, [1991] ECR I-2925), the Court has implicitly confirmed that the same rule ap-
plies to derogations from other EC law provisions (see Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. 
Council, [2006] ECR I-5769).
191. Para 44 of the judgment. On the details of these general principles, see Tridimas (op. 
cit. supra note 186), ch. 6.
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statement could be understood to confirm that all the general principles of 
EC law apply to the Third Pillar, but it is not unambiguous to this effect. Of 
course, it certainly confirms that two important general principles apply to 
the Third Pillar. Another main element of the Pupino judgment is, of course, 
the application of the EC law principle of effectiveness.192 
Later on, the Court stated in Van Esbroek that the rule against double jeop-
ardy was “a fundamental principle of Community law”, and in Van Straaten 
that its interpretation of the Schengen double jeopardy rules was justified by 
the “principles of legal certainty and of the protection of legitimate expecta-
tions”.193 While these judgments do not expressly state that the rule against 
double jeopardy and the protection of legitimate expectations are general 
principles of law applicable to the Third Pillar, it is hard to interpret the judg-
ments any other way.194 
In Advocaten voor de Wereld, in response to a question from the nation-
al court which explicitly asked if a provision of the Framework Decision 
on the European arrest warrant was compatible with Article 6(2) TEU, the 
Court ruled that the principle of respect for fundamental rights – and specifi-
cally the principle of equality and non-discrimination – applied to the third 
pillar.195 
As for the principles governing the exercise of Community powers, subsid-
iarity (as defined by Art. 5 EC) is expressly referred to in Article 2 TEU. One 
Advocate General has assumed that the principle of proportionality must also 
apply within the Third Pillar, as “a mechanism to facilitate subsidiarity”;196 
indeed, the principle is often referred to in the preambles of Third Pillar leg-
islation.197 The principle of conferred powers is virtually explicit in the word-
192. Paras 36, 38 and 42 of the judgment. On the details of this general principle, see Tridi-
mas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 9. See also the Opinions in Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra 
note 23) and Kretzinger (supra note 23).
193. Para 40 of the Van Esbroeck judgment (supra note 21); para 59 of the Van Straaten 
judgment (supra note 23). On the details of the general principle of legitimate expectations, see 
Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 6.
194. In particular, the Court referred in Van Esbroeck to a First Pillar competition law judg-
ment, and several opinions of A.G. Sharpston have argued that the rule against double jeopardy 
is a fully-fledged general principle of law (Opinions in: Gasparini, para 27; Kraaijenbrink, paras 
60–63; and Kretzinger, paras 65 and 70, all supra note 23).
195. Paras. 55–60 (supra note 23). See also Opinions in Spain v. Eurojust (supra note 31), 
paras 32 and 33; Segi (supra note 64), para 115; and Advocaten voor de Wereld, paras 83–99. 
196. Opinion in Advocaten voor de Wereld, (supra note 23), para 61. See Tridimas (op. cit. 
supra note 186), ch. 4.
197. For example, see the Opinion in Advocaten voor de Wereld, ibid., para 62, and Tridi-
mas, ibid. ch. 3.
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ing of Articles 5 and 43(d) TEU,198 and has been referred to in judgments of 
the Court of First Instance and the Opinion of an Advocate General.199
If the principle of proportionality governs the review of EU measures, it 
must surely also be concluded that, for the sake of consistency, the principle 
also applies to the review of national measures falling within the scope of 
Third Pillar law.200 This has been assumed in the Opinions of Advocate Gen-
eral Sharpston.201 Finally, while the principle of the right to a defence has not 
been mentioned to date in Third Pillar case law, it would be astounding, given 
the subject matter of the Third Pillar and its close link to human rights prin-
ciples, if this principle did not apply to Third Pillar measures.202 
In conclusion, the EU Treaty and the case law of the Court of Justice has 
confirmed that many general principles of Community law apply to the Third 
Pillar, and the case law of the CFI and the Opinions of various advocates 
general have endorsed the application of most or all of the others. Moreover, 
there is no indication from the case law (including CFI judgments or Opin-
ions) that any of the general principles should be considered inapplicable to 
the Third Pillar. As I argued eight years ago,203 there is no reason to conclude 
from the text of the Treaties that any of the general principles is inapplica-
ble. Application of all of the general principles would be consistent with the 
foundation of the EU upon the “rule of law” and the fact that Article 220 EC 
(concerning the role of the Court of Justice upholding the rule of law) also 
applies to the Third Pillar.204 For the sake of legal clarity and certainty, the 
Court should take an early opportunity to state clearly that all Community 
law general principles apply to the Third Pillar.
198. The latter provision is one of the conditions for authorizing “enhanced cooperation” in 
any of the three pillars: it provides that any proposed enhanced cooperation must remain “within 
the limits of the powers of the Union or of the Community”.
199. See respectively Segi and OMPI, discussed supra section 2, and the Opinion in Segi, 
para 104 (supra note 64).
200. See Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 5.
201. Opinions in Kraaijenbrink, para 60 and Kretzinger, paras 64, 65 and 70 (both supra 
note 23).
202. See Tridimas (op. cit. supra note 186), ch. 8.
203. Peers, “Watchmen” (op. cit. supra note 1), at 378.
204. See the discussion of the ECJ’s Segi judgment in supra section 4. On the link between 
the general principles and Art. 220 EC, see for instance the Opinion in Palacios de la Villa 
(supra note 172).
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5. Conclusions 
The case law of the Court of Justice on the system for judicial protection in 
the Third Pillar has established a number of important principles, but many 
key issues remain open. This paper has aimed, in light of this initial case law, 
to suggest an interpretation of the relevant Third Pillar provisions of the EU 
Treaty which ensures judicial protection as much as possible, consistent with, 
on the one hand, the Treaty’s broad tasks and objectives and, on the other 
hand, with the intentions of the Treaty drafters to limit the extent of integra-
tion within the framework of the Third Pillar. Whichever approach the Court 
takes on these issues, it would be useful for it to clarify some key underlying 
issues, such as the role of national courts in controlling the legality of EU 
acts and the application of the general principles of EU law. It would also be 
useful for the Court to see how to resolve the tension between the establish-
ment of a “single institutional framework” in Article 3 TEU and the distinc-
tiveness of the EC and EU Treaties, as set out in Article 5 TEU. 
From either a Eurosceptic or pro-integration perspective, the interpretation 
I have suggested above may smack of a rather “political” compromise, rather 
than a finely nuanced legal argument. But then, the same point could be 
made of the Court of Justice’s case law on lack of horizontal direct effect of 
Directives, the lack of direct effect of WTO law, the case law on the effect of 
EC law on national procedural rules, the external competence of the Commu-
nity, the division of powers between national courts and the Court of Justice 
as regards the interpretation and validity of Community law, or the principle 
of “institutional balance”. The Court of Justice has developed and maintained 
its key position in the hierarchy of the Community legal order, and retained 
sufficient support for its doctrines from national courts, by constantly steer-
ing a careful path between judicial activism and political realism. 
Nevertheless, despite the Court’s best efforts to date, there are still some 
fundamental defects in the legal structure of the Third Pillar that the Court 
cannot repair by itself. The system for controlling the legality of EU acts 
and their effective and uniform interpretation within national legal systems 
appears to fall short of the basic minimum standards established by the Com-
munity legal order (which could in any event still be improved). Unfortunate-
ly it seems that “salvation” cannot fully be obtained outside the true “church” 
of Community law.
